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Abstract
This dissertation studies the impact of policy changes on health and education of children
in the developing world. In the first two chapters, I focus on the issue of sex selection. The final
chapter studies the impact of a sanitation program on the health of children in India. Altogether,
the dissertation highlights the role of good policy in targeting various health and education issues
for children.
The first chapter studies whether increasing political representation of women in India chal-
lenges gender discrimination and thus reduces sex selection. Exploiting the implementation of an
Indian law that required one-third of local political seats to be reserved for women, I investigate the
impact of female leadership on sex selection in rural India. I find that higher birth order children
are less likely to be male if political seats at the local level have been reserved for women. Addi-
tionally, I find that higher birth order female child mortality rates decline once states implement
female reservations. After ruling out alternative hypotheses, I argue the underlying mechanism is
a change in attitudes due to exposure to female leaders.
The second chapter studies whether abortion legalization, or reduced costs to sex select,
improves education outcomes for girls that are not initially aborted in Taiwan. I find that girls
born at higher birth orders after the legalization of abortion experience an improvement in their
university attendance rates by approximately 4.5 percentage points. Moreover, a similar improve-
ment in university attendance rates for higher birth order boys is not found. These findings extend
existing literature by providing evidence of the substitution hypothesis, the idea that prenatal and
postnatal discrimination are substitutes, for a later life economic outcome.
The final chapter presents evidence that increased sanitation improved the health of children
iv
in India. The results highlight the state of Maharashtra’s early success in adopting sanitation-
related policy, and I find that improved sanitation decreased diarrheal prevalence for children of
Maharashtra. My findings also suggest that sanitation improvement decreased the prevalence of
cough and fever for young children. Additionally, I find that the results are not unique to the
Indian state of Maharashtra, and I show successful implementation of sanitation policy also led to
an improvement in childhood health nationwide in India.
Overall, these findings suggest that banning sex selection at birth would lead to discrimination
against female children later in life. Based on the results from my first two chapters, I argue that
policies that help reduce underlying male preference by improving views towards women should be
implemented instead of policies that prohibit sex selection at birth. Results from this dissertation
also emphasize the need for good sanitation programs in the developing world to improve the health
of children.
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Chapter 1
Seeing is Believing - Can Increasing the Number of Female Leaders Reduce
Sex Selection in Rural India?
1.1 Introduction
While sex selection is a known problem in many Asian countries, most policies designed to
prevent it either fail or lead to postnatal sex selection and discrimination. Despite the implementa-
tion of a ban on ultrasound testing in 1996, sex ratios in India remain skewed. Moreover, improved
ability to prenatally sex select has been shown to increase prenatal sex selection while reducing
postnatal sex selection, suggesting that families substitute between forms of sex selection depending
on what is available to them (Lin et al., 2008). Then even a well enforced ultrasound ban could
result in families substituting from prenatal to postnatal forms of sex selection. An alternative
method to reduce sex selection is to target the underlying son preference that stirs the demand for
boys. One way to reduce male preference could be to improve the status of women. In this paper, I
examine the case of an Indian policy that increased female leadership in rural India and show that
it has also led to a decrease in sex selection at the highest birth order in rural India.
Son preference in India is generally attributed to the fact that girls leave home after marriage
and do not contribute to the family later in life. In a traditional sense, a daughter’s contribution
to the family is limited to helping with the household chores. Deeply embedded cultural views
regarding female roles are challenged as increasing political and work force participation of women
in India begin to define the new norm. Increasing the status of women and the exposure to them
in leadership roles challenges traditional suppressive beliefs and practices against them.
2In 1993, India executed drastic measures at the national level to increase female political
representation. The 73rd and the 74th Amendments to India’s constitution first established na-
tionally recognized local governments at levels smaller than the state, and second required that
these newly developed local governments reserve one-third of political positions, including those of
chairpersons, for women. Within a short window of time following the Amendment’s passage, India
experienced a large influx of female leaders at the local level. The 73rd Amendment established
local governance at the rural level, while the 74th Amendment did so at the urban level. This anal-
ysis focuses on governments established under the 73rd Amendment, and as a result, studies rural
populations. The 73rd Amendment established a three-tier system of local governance for which
the traditional name for local government, the Panchayat, was adopted. The tiers, in the order of
the smallest locality to the largest, were local governments at the village (Gram Panchayat), the
block (Panchayat Samiti), and the district level (Zilla Parishad).
Exploiting the timing of elections that reserved seats for women following the 73rd Amend-
ment, I investigate whether an increased political role for women reduces sex selection in rural
India. Beaman et al. (2012) finds that exposure to female leaders improves parents’ stated aspi-
rations for female children. In the same vein, I consider whether increasing female visibility and
power outside of the household could reduce male preference, and hence sex selection. Currently,
there is no study that considers whether female political leadership changes sex selection.
The 73rd Amendment provides a unique opportunity to study the impact of exogenously
increased female governance. Even though women in India occasionally serve as state governors,
comparing sex selection across states with female governors and states with male governors will
not reveal a causal effect of female governance. Of the nine female governors appointed since 1990,
six have been in South Indian states that are known for low gender discrimination. This imbalance
suggests that female governors are appointed in areas with an already low gender bias. Instead of
just comparing states with male governors to states with female governors, I rely on a change in
national policy that arguably exogenously increased the number of local government positions held
3by women.
Intuitively, the implementation of the 73rd Amendment could either increase or decrease sex
selection. Frustrations from female leadership in a society where heads of households are typically
male could lead to a backlash against women and increase sex selection. It is also possible that
female leaders improve access to fertility services and reduce costs of ultrasound and other fertility
controlling services, which could also increase sex selection. Alternatively, it could be that female
leaders provide better overall health care, from which the marginal children (girls) would have the
most to gain, thus improving survival rates for girls. In addition to reserving seats for women, the
73rd Amendment also devolved powers of the government to the local level. If the newly established
local governments are more responsive to their constituents’ health needs, then this could also lead
to an overall health improvement that benefits female children more and reduces sex ratios. The
answer might also lie in a mechanism that is more complicated. It could be that being exposed to
women leaders changes the underlying beliefs regarding female roles in the family and the perceived
return from a daughter, which could decrease male preference.
I study the impact of female leadership on sex selection by exploiting variation in both the
timing of when a state has Panchayat elections following the 73rd Amendment (effectively the time
that seats for women are first reserved) and in birth order of child to estimate a difference-in-
difference (DD) model. The model investigates birth order-specific effects, because sex selection is
known to occur disproportionately more at higher birth orders, or for the younger children within
a family.1 I find that higher birth order children born after a Panchayat election abiding with the
73rd Amendment - or after female seats have been reserved - are less likely to be male in rural India.
Robustness checks verify that high birth order girls born after reservations for women are made
are less likely to die before turning one year old, relative to high birth order boys born following
reservations.
States typically have elections at all three levels of Panchayats at the same time, and as a
1 Chu (2001), Ebenstein (2007), Lin et al. (2008), and Kalsi (2014) also report that sex selection is greatest for
higher birth orders. Das Gupta (1987) provides evidence that higher birth order girls are more discriminated against
in rural Punjab, India.
4result, a methodology that relies purely on timing of Panchayat elections will not reveal which level
of female seat reservations (district, block, or village) is most responsible for the effect. To directly
explore the source of the effect, I use data on randomly assigned female chairperson reservations
at the district level from several states. I study whether a high birth order child born in a district
while the chairperson seat was reserved for a woman is less likely to be a boy. Although the
district Panchayats govern rural areas of a district, they are most visible in urban areas due to
the location of their offices in district headquarters. Additionally, local newspapers often report on
activities occurring at the district Panchayat, and readership of newspapers is much more common
in urban areas making the members of the district Panchayat better known in urban towns. To
test whether visibility alone could impact sex selection, I also study the impact of reservations
at the district Panchayat for the urban population. In fact, I find that district level Panchayat
reservations for women result in urban areas exhibiting a decline in sex selection, while rural areas
have no change. This evidence, coupled with the aforementioned results on rural areas, suggests
that in rural Indian communities, the lower level Panchayats at the village or the block level are
driving the main results. This is consistent with previous literature, as Iyer et al. (2012) similarly
shows that the impact of female leadership on female reporting of crime is through reservations
at lower level Panchayats. In contrast to previous findings, my research suggests that researchers
studying the effect of district Panchayat reservations should look at urban and rural populations
separately, as urban populations may be affected through district level reservations.
Finding that district Panchayat chairperson reservations for women decreases the share of
boys in urban areas and not in rural areas also speaks to the underlying mechanism. Since the
district Panchayat is responsible for development projects in rural India, there is no reason why an
urban population should feel the effect of female reservations at the district Panchayat, except if
the mechanism is purely exposure to powerful women.
This paper begins with an overview of existing literature on political seat reservations for
women in India in Section 2. Section 3 presents the historical context. Section 3.1 discusses
5the availability of different methods of sex selection in India. Section 3.2 provides important
background information on the policy change. The timing of when states in the sample have an
election is explicitly discussed, and the choice of states in the most preferred sample is explained in
Section 3.3. The data sets are explained in Section 4, and Section 5 provides summary statistics.
The methodology relies on variation in the timing around when a state has a relevant election
reserving seats for women and the birth order of children. The corresponding estimating equation
is introduced in Section 6. Other methodologies that exploit data on geographical reservation
status of the district level Panchayats is also introduced in Section 6. Section 7.1 presents the main
results. Evidence that the estimated difference-in-difference model is valid is shown in both graphs
and equations in Section 7.2. Various robustness checks are studied in Section 8. Section 9 reviews
possible mechanisms consistent with the results. Section 10 concludes.
1.2 Relevant Literature
An extensive literature shows that cultural preferences for boys is associated with a higher
ratio of boys (Anderson and Ray, 2010; Das Gupta, 1987; Goodkind, 1996; Lin et al., 2008; Qian,
2008). A large and recent literature also investigates the impact of increased female political roles
in India on various economic and behavioral changes. Exploiting the 73rd Amendment, various
studies support different effects of female government on economic and behavioral outcomes in rural
India. Using data on the randomization of female head assignment of village Pancahayats from
Rajasthan and West Bengal, Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004b) finds that village leaders invest
more in infrastructure more closely related to the needs of their own gender. More specifically,
female leaders in West Bengal invest more in water and road constructions and less in education,
while female leaders in Rajasthan invest more in water and less in roads. Ban and Rao (2008)
extends the findings of Chattopadhyay and Duflo (2004b) to South Indian states, where gender
disparity is a lesser concern. They find that village Panchayats with female chairs are no better or
worse than those with male chairs. Moreover, they do not find evidence supporting Chattopadhyay
and Duflo (2004b)’s finding for South Indian states, and chairs are not found to be more likely to
6serve the needs that more directly impact their own gender.
Beaman et al. (2011) finds that female political seat reservations increased female citizen
participation at local political meetings. While there is no impact on the gender of the attendees at
the meetings, women are significantly more likely to speak at the village Panchayat meetings when
the village Panchayat chair is also a woman. Beaman et al. (2009) finds that voters are more likely
to elect women as leaders once females have served as the chair of the village Panchayat in West
Bengal. The authors argue that the mechanism underlying the effect is a shift in voters’ beliefs
regarding the effectiveness of female politicians. A different study, Beaman et al. (2012), reports
that female political reservations in India increases girls’ aspirations and educational attainment.
Additionally, the authors find that the gender gap in parents’ aspirations for their children closes
by 20 percent if the head of the village Panchayat is also a woman. The underlying mechanism is
shown to be a role model effect where exposure to successful women reduces gender bias, rather than
an institutional change benefitting females. Although previous research suggests that increasing
female visibility and power through an increased role in the government affects various behavioral
and economic outcomes, to my knowledge there is no research that studies the impact of a female
role in government on fertility outcomes in rural India. While researchers have found evidence of
increased parental aspirations for their daughters, I investigate whether this also translates into a
decreased gender bias at birth, and hence, a reduction in sex selection.
1.3 Background
1.3.1 Sex Selection Availability
While in the rest of the world, women outnumber men by three to five percent, the 2001
Indian census revealed that men outnumbered women by seven percent in India (Patel, 2007). This
distortion in the share of men is attributed to sex selection in India. Families achieve the desired
sex ratio of children using various methods. These methods can be summarized to occur either
prior to conception, during pregnancy, at birth, or during early childhood (Das Gupta et al., 2003).
7More specifically, parents can choose to stop childbearing after a birth of a male, use sex-selective
technology like ultrasound and abort a female fetus, kill a female infant at the time of birth, or
neglect a daughter which results in her death later in life (Das Gupta et al., 2003).
India legalized abortion in 1971 under the medical termination of pregnancy (MTP) Act
(Visaria, 2007). Legal abortion was allowed when pregnancy carried health risks to a woman,
endangered her mental health, resulted from rape, or resulted from contraception failure (Visaria,
2007). Due to the many restrictions under which abortion was allowed to be carried out legally and
also because of the limited availability of clinics that offered legal abortions, illegal abortions have
been estimated to be carried out between 8 to 11 times more often than legal abortions (Chhabra and
Sheel, 1993). While illegal providers include non-medical personnel, illegal providers also include
medical professionals and gynecologists who are not registered to provide the service (Arnold et al.,
2002). According to government statistics, approximately 2.7 in 100 known pregnancies result in
an abortion in India (Arnold et al., 2002).
Ultrasound became common in India only after the early 1990s (Clark, 2000). The use of
ultrasound and increasing sex-selective abortions led to a feminist movement that demanded the
practice of sex-detection to be banned. The Government of India responded with the passage of the
Pre-Natal Diagnostic Techniques (PNDT) Act of 1994, which came into force in January of 1996
(Government of India, 2006). The PNDT Act did not ban the use to ultrasound for prenatal care,
but prohibited the sex of the child to be revealed. Since the Act, there has been no evidence that the
PNDT reduced sex selection (Visaria, 2007), and the enforcement of the law has been practically
nonexistent (Arnold et al., 2002). Retherford and Roy (2003) highlights the many loopholes in the
law. For example, government clinics are monitored much more closely than private clinics, and
private clinics are only required to register if they perform ultrasound (Retherford and Roy, 2003).
Moreover, doctors now reveal the sex of the child verbally instead of in writing (Retherford and Roy,
2003). Also, focus group discussions with over 400 women of diverse socio-economic and educational
groups in Haryana and Gujarat revealed that while women were aware that sex detection is not
8available at a public hospital, they knew of private clinics where they could receive a test and how
much the test would cost (Visaria, 2007). Anecdotal evidence suggests that competition in the
provision of illegal ultrasound has even led to a decline in its price (Visaria, 2007). Ultrasound use
has been heterogeneous in India; mainly, its use to perform sex selective abortions is more prevalent
in the urban parts of India (Retherford and Roy, 2003).
While the normal sex ratio is said to be 105 boys per 100 girls for children between the ages 0
and 6, sex ratios in India worsened from 105.8 in 1991 to 107.8 in 2001, and then further worsened
to 109 by 2011 (The Economist, 2011). Jha et al. (2011) use all three rounds of the Indian National
Family Health Survey (NFHS) and presents the weighted averages of sex ratios at birth for each
birth year using two overlapping data points. The trends from Jha et al. (2011) also find a steady
worsening of the sex ratios in the 1990 to 2004 period. The next section provides background for
the 73rd Amendment.
1.3.2 Historical Context of the 73rd Amendment
Prior to the adoption of the 73rd and the 74th Amendments, the states were the smallest
units of government recognized by the Indian constitution.2 Public debate over the national gov-
ernment’s failure to deliver public services, infrastructure, and alleviate poverty led to a general
consensus among politicians that devolving powers to the local level was the solution (Chaudhuri,
2003). The efforts to devolve powers in India have origins dating back to 1989 when earlier versions
of the bill were proposed. While earlier incarnations of the legislation were generally well received,
they were eventually defeated because the states did not have enough discretion in the implemen-
tation of the bill (Chaudhuri, 2003). Allowing states flexibility in design and implementation, the
73rd and the 74th Amendments were re-introduced in the Parliament and were eventually passed
in December of 1992. The 73rd Amendment went into effect in April of 1993, whereas the 74th
Amendment went into effect in June of 1993 (Chaudhuri, 2003).
The 73rd Amendment established a pyramid structure for local rural government, with the
2 This section draws heavily from Chaudhuri (2003) and Vyasulu and Vyasulu (1999).
9village level Panchayat at the base. The Gram Sabha, or the people, elect members of the village
Panchayat and also help to hold elected members accountable and ensure funds are being properly
used. The block level Panchayat are next up in the hierarchy of local Panchayats. They provide
the link between the village Panchayats and the highest unit of local governance at the district level
Panchayat. The district Panchayat provides the direct link between the state and local governments.
A graphic representation of the structure of localized government in rural India is shown in Figure
1.1. On average, there are 28 members of the district Panchayat with each member representing
an average of 47,556 people. Similarly, average number of officials at the block level is 22 and each
member represents an average of 4,735 people. Village level Panchayat has on average 12 members
with each member representing an average of 281 people. The task of the new local government
bodies was to implement development plans based on local needs for rural areas. Responsibilities
included land improvement, infrastructural and ecological development, poverty alleviation, and
development of women, children, and individuals of historically disadvantaged castes.
The 73rd Amendment included both mandatory and discretionary provisions. The mandatory
provisions called for the establishment of local Panchayats at the village, the block, and the district
levels. Further requirements were direct elections, mandatory every 5 years, for Panchayats at all
three levels. Seats in Panchayats at all three levels, including those of chairpersons, were to be
reserved for historically disadvantaged castes in proportion to their populations. Additionally, one-
third of total seats, including those of chairpersons, were to be reserved for women at Panchayats
at all three levels. In most states, elections at all three levels were scheduled at the same time.
Note that the law did not require any reservations at the state level, but only at the three tiers
of the Panchayat Raj Institutions. The states were given one year to pass conformity acts by
either amending existing laws or by passing entirely new laws in line with the 73rd Amendment
(Chaudhuri, 2003). Additionally, states were given two years to complete decisions on the new
Panchayats and failing to do so posed the risk of losing central government’s assistance (Jain,
1996).
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Figure 1.1: Panchayat Raj Institutions: Three-tier structure of local rural government. Average
number of elected members given. Average population served per elected official is reported in
parenthesis. Source: (Alok, 2011)
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In short, the discretionary provisions of the Amendment were those that allowed these lo-
cal bodies to self-govern. For example, devolution of powers and responsibilities in planning of
schemes for development, poverty alleviation, development of women and children were discre-
tionary (Chaudhuri, 2003). While the Amendments set up local bodies of governments, how effec-
tive these local bodies were in delivering goods and services to local needs depended on how much
power the states bestowed on them. While most states have taken mandatory actions regarding
elections, not surprisingly, the level of devolution of power varied across states.
These Amendments were not driven by a grassroots movement, but were instead initiated
and implemented by higher levels of government (Vyasulu and Vyasulu, 1999). As a result, women
were suddenly brought into politics, and most women were somewhat unprepared for leadership
(Vyasulu and Vyasulu, 1999). The first round of elections between 1993 and 1994 alone brought in
about 800,000 women to work for local governments in a nation where there was very little female
involvement in politics initially (Vyasulu and Vyasulu, 1999).
One may wonder in what ways do women serving in local Panchayats interact with the local
people. Direct interaction between the people and the Panchayats is greatest at the village level
Panchayat. In general, village level Panchayats hold two to three meetings which are led by the
chairperson per year. These meetings are open to the public and provide direct interaction between
the villagers and the members of the local governments. Through their interactions with the local
people as leaders, women serving as Panchayat members have reported enhancement in their status
amongst the community, and many even mention that their husbands and families have also gained
in status (Jayal, 2006). Even in states with high levels of patriarchy, women report status gains.
For example, 72 percent of female members of Panchayats in Madhya Pradesh and 90 percent of
women in Rajasthan report an increase in status (Jayal, 2006).
While in rural areas, interaction of the locals with the new Panchayat leaders is greatest at
the village level, the same is not true for urban areas. In fact, urban areas are exposed to female
leadership at the highest level of the Panchayat, or at the district level. As district Panchayats have
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offices that are located in the district centers, they are physically more exposed in urban towns.
Additionally, newspapers often report on developments occurring at the district Panchayat, and
given that readership of newspapers in India is much higher in urban versus rural areas, exposure
to female leaders at the district Panchayat is also greater due to newspaper readership in urban
areas. Although the district Panchayat is set up under the 73rd Amendment, hence its duties are
to serve the rural population, its leaders are more visible to the urban population.
1.3.3 State Elections
India currently has 28 states, of which three were carved out from existing states after the
year 2000. Table 1.1 provides the most complete list of relevant elections for 18 Indian states I was
able to construct. According to the 2011 census, 90.42 percent of the nation’s population lives in
one of these 18 states. For each state, I report when the state had an election following the 73rd
Amendment. For the first election in which the state reserved seats for women, I report both the
month and the year of election. States were required to hold elections every 5 years following the
first election, and I report the year the state had a second election or third election after the law
change. I only report election years up to the year 2004 because the DLHS II was conducted in
2004, and as a result, my main sample only includes children born up to 2004. When possible, I
report the last Panchayat election the state had prior to the constitutional establishment of the
PRIs.3 Additionally, I report the state’s share of boys born in 1992, a year prior to the law change.
Table 1.1 shows that there is a great degree of variation in the timing of elections. This could
present potential issues of endogeneity in an analysis that relies on the timing of state elections. For
example, it is possible that states with delayed elections are simply buying time before they have
to adapt to female leadership, in which case the timing of elections will be correlated with male
preference. Since the law required that states pass conformity laws in line with the 73rd Amendment
within a year and also required that the states complete decisions on their new Panchayats within
3 Local Panchayats have operated prior to the establishment of the 73rd Amendment in some states, albeit
enshrining them in the constitution required a three tier system of Panchayats and regularity in elections.
13
Table 1.1: Panchayat Election Dates
Post Reservation Pre Amendment Share of Boys
Election 1 Election 2 Election 3 Election 1992
State Month Year Year Year Year
Orissa May 1992 1997 2002 1992 0.486
Maharashtra Nov 1992 1997 2002 1992 0.509
West Bengal May 1993 1998 2003 1988 0.544
Karnataka Dec 1993 2000 0.518
Haryana June 1994 2000 1991 0.519
Madhya Pradesh June 1994 2000 1982 0.521
Tripura August 1994 1999 2004 0.547
Rajasthan March 1995 2000 1988 0.537
Andhra Pradesh March 1995 2001 1970 0.504
Uttar Pradesh April 1995 2000 0.541
Gujarat June 1995 2002 1975 0.532
Kerala Sept 1995 2000 0.525
Tamil Nadu Oct 1996 2001 1986 0.520
Goa Jan 1997 2002 1991 0.477
Manipur Jan 1997 2002 1978 0.515
Punjab June 1998 2003 1993 0.537
Assam Nov 2000 1992 0.581
Bihar April 2001 1978 0.523
Election dates up to 2004 for every state. The last pre-Amendment Panchayat election date is reported.
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two years, states that have an election by 1995 are abiding by the law. Hence the preferred sample
consists of states that have their first election by 1995, or approximately within two years following
the law change. This effectively reduces the analysis to 12 states in total. These states are shown
in Figure 1.2.
Figure 1.2: States with elections within 2 years following the implementation of 73rd Amendment
A few states were quite progressive in their adoption of the 73rd Amendment and reserved
seats prior to its coming into force. The state of Orissa, for example, held village and block level
Panchayat elections between May and June of 1992. These were held according to the provisions
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of the 73rd Amendment prior to its coming into effect in April of 1993. Similarly the state of
Maharashtra also reserved seats for women for Panchayat elections at the district and the village
level in November of 1992, prior to the law change. The eagerness of Orissa and Maharashtra to
adopt the law prior to its coming into force could be correlated with state unobservables that are
correlated with the state’s male preference. Thus, Orissa and Maharashtra should arguably be
excluded from the preferred sample. Additionally, to reduce sex selection, the state of Haryana
offered a financial incentive to eligible parents with daughters in 1994.4 This policy was introduced
in the state in October of 1994, while the state had its first election that reserved seats for women
in June of 1994. With coinciding timing of these two events, and with treatment determined by
timing, it is difficult to distinguish which policy underlies the effect for the state of Haryana. Thus,
I also exclude Haryana from the main sample. Limiting the states to those who have their first
election by 1995 while excluding Orissa, Maharashtra, and Haryana reduces the analysis to 9 Indian
states in total.5 Although the preferred sample consists of only 9 states, according to the 2011
Indian census, nearly 56 percent of the nation’s population resided in one of these states. The
location of these 9 states within India is shown in Figure 1.3. As male preference in India varies by
region (e.g. South Indian states do not exhibit a strong male preference), it is reassuring to find
that the main sample has states from the northern, eastern and southern regions of India. Because
of the spatial variation in the location of the states in the preferred sample, the results are arguably
representative of India as a whole.
4 Haryana is one of the wealthiest states in India with one of the most distorted sex ratios in the nation. To reduce
male preference, the state introduced the Apni Beti Apna Dhan (ABAD) program in October of 1994. The program
provided families with daughters a monetary award within 15 days of her birth, and each girl was also endowed with
an additional reward redeemable at the age of 18 (Sinha and Yoong, 2009). Another attempt to reduce sex ratios in
Haryana was implemented in September of 2002. Devirupak provided monthly cash transfers to couples who chose to
be sterilized after the birth of their first child, with a larger transfer paid to families who chose to be sterilized after
a birth of a daughter (Anukriti, 2013).
5 West Bengal has elections that reserve seats for women in May of 1993, which was only 1 month following
the 73rd Amendment. Thus, one could argue that the state of West Bengal is behaving progressively as well. The
omission of West Bengal from the preferred sample yields similar results.
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Figure 1.3: States with elections within 2 years following the implementation of 73rd Amendment:
excluding states that had elections prior to the reform and Haryana.
1.4 Data
The main specification uses two data sets. First, I use data from the District Level Health
and Facility Survey (DLHS), which were purchased from the International Institute for Population
Sciences (IIPS) in Mumbai, India. These data include detailed information on a woman’s fertility
history. For each pregnancy, I have information on the child’s date of birth, birth order, gender,
and information on whether the child is still alive. The data also provide information on household
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and mother’s characteristics. The finest level of location identified in the DLHS is at the district
level. In addition to the fertility survey, I construct a data set on when the new policy of reserving
female seats in each state became effective. Because states in India have control over when local
elections for Panchayats are held, female seats were not reserved until a state had its first Panchayat
election. I collect information on when each state had Panchayat elections following the passage
of the 73rd Amendment. Most states have elections at all three levels of PRIs at the same time.
States that diverge from having a collective election are generally those that have an election prior
to the 73rd Amendment, in which they only had elections at some of the levels during their first
round of elections.
The data on election timing are mostly collected from a textbook titled Status of Panchayati
Raj in the States and the Union Territories of India 2000. I also rely on states’ Panchayat websites
to provide information on the timing of the first election that reserved seats for women. Linking
the fertility and state election data sets together, I define treatment as whether a child is born after
his/her state had its first election that reserved seats for women.
A key feature of the 73rd Amendment is that female seat reservations were assigned at random
in most states. Since fertility data from the DLHS provide district identifiers, I also make use of
data on district Panchayat reservations of chairpersons to study whether the a district reserving a
seat for a woman alters sex selection in that particular district. The data on district Panchayat
chairperson reservations allow me to explore whether reservations at the highest PRI level explain
the effect. If district level Panchayats reservations do not affect sex selection in rural India, it is
implied that reservations at lower levels of PRIs, the block or the village, explain the reduction in
sex selection observed in this analysis.
1.5 Summary Statistics
Table 1.2 provides summary statistics for mothers in the preferred sample using the DLHS.
I split the table between mothers in the sample with at least one child who is born after their state
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reserved seats for women and mothers with no children born following reservations. In general,
mothers with at least one child born after their state reserved seats are younger, less likely to be
able to read and less likely to come from houses that are made of “strong construction”. While they
have more children ever born, they have fewer children who have died. While there are no more
or less boys born to mothers with at least one child born after reservations, there are significantly
more girls born to them.
Table 1.2: Summary statistics for mothers in the sample
At least 1 child born after reservations? No Yes Diff
Age 32.98 25.95 -7.03***
Mother is Literate 0.48 0.40 -0.08***
Total Children Dead 1.87 1.78 -0.09***
Total Children Born 2.34 2.70 0.36***
Total Boys Born 1.39 1.39 0.00
Total Girls Born 0.96 1.32 0.36***
Have a Strong House 0.33 0.21 -0.13***
Age at First Birth 18.81 18.37 -0.44***
Observations 9,497 89,530
Sample weights used. Sample restricted to mothers with children born between
1987 and 2004 in rural areas of states that have elections that reserve seats for
women by 1995. Haryana, Maharashtra, and Orissa excluded from sample.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Tables 1.3 and 1.4 provide summary statistics in line with the main estimating equation.
Table 1.3 shows the change in the birth order-specific share of boys for children born in law abiding
states that had an election by 1995, while excluding Orissa, Maharashtra, and Haryana. I find
that 54.4 percent of the children born at birth order 3 or greater before reservations for women go
into effect are male and that this ratio declines to 52.5 percent for children post-reservations. The
share of boys at birth order 1 increases from 51.1 percent to 51.7 percent following reservations,
but this change is not statistically significant. The summary difference-in-difference estimate finds
an overall decline of 2.5 percentage points in high birth order share of boys, and it is statistically
significant at the 1 percent level. Table 1.4 shows that the share of boys decreases from 52.3 percent
to 52.1 percent for birth order 2 children, but this decline is not statistically significant. Tables
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1.3 and 1.4 provide evidence that share of boys declines for the highest birth order children. These
summary statistics are provided in the spirit of the main methodologies, which I discuss next.
Table 1.3: Birth Order 3 or Greater: Differences in mean share of boys
Pre Reservation Post Reservation Diff
Order ≥ 3 0.544 0.525 -0.019***
Order = 1 0.511 0.517 0.006
Diff 0.033*** 0.008** -0.025***
Sample weights used. Sample restricted to surviving children born be-
tween 1987-2004 in rural areas of states that reserve seats for women
by 1995. Haryana, Maharashtra, and Orissa excluded from sample.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 1.4: Birth Order 2: Differences in mean share of boys
Pre Reservation Post Reservation Diff
Order = 2 0.523 0.521 -0.002
Order = 1 0.511 0.517 0.006
Diff 0.012** 0.004 -0.008
Sample weights used. Sample restricted to surviving children born
between 1987-2004 in rural areas of states that reserve seats for
women by 1995. Haryana, Maharashtra, and Orissa excluded from
sample.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1.6 Methodologies
1.6.1 Sex Ratios
The main specification is a difference-in-difference model described in Equation (1.1). The
sample consists of surviving children from rural India, where the 73rd Amendment was relevant.
In this model, the first difference is across time, looking before and after an election that reserves
seats for women, and the second difference is across birth order of child.
Boyics = β1I(Order ≥ 3)i × Post Reservecs + β2I(Order = 2)i × Post Reservecs
+β3Post Reservecs + β4I(Order ≥ 3)i + β5I(Order = 2)i + γs + θc + ΓXics + ics
(1.1)
The dependent variable is an indicator variable for whether child i, of birth cohort c, born in state s,
is a boy. Because the sample is restricted to children who have survived, this specification captures
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both prenatal and postnatal forms of sex selection.6 Post Reservecs is an indicator variable
for whether the child is born after his/her state had its first Panchayat election following the
Amendment, or equivalently after the first time the child’s state reserved seats for female leaders.
As families tend to sex select the most at the highest birth orders, I interact the effect of being born
after reservations were adopted, Post Reservecs, with indicators for both birth order 2 and birth
order 3 or greater separately. Although my results indicate that most sex selection in India occurs
at birth orders 3 or greater, by including separate effects for birth order 2, I am able to explore any
changes that may occur at the second birth order as well. Children of birth order 1 are the omitted
category, and β1 and β2 are the parameters of interest. They compare changes in the likelihood
that a child born at high birth orders after reservations for women are made is a boy with changes
in the likelihood that a child born at the first birth order after reservations is a boy.7 Also included
are fixed effects for birth orders 3 or greater and birth order 2. To increase the precision of how the
treatment is defined, I use both month and year variation to code birth and post-reservation dates.
Also included in the regression are state fixed effects that control for state-specific differences in the
ratio of boys. Fixed effects for birth year of the child are also included to help control for annual
trends in the ratio of boys in rural India.8 Note that the coefficient on Post Reservecs is estimated
using variation in the timing of elections across states, so it is still identified even with the inclusion
of birth year fixed effects. I also control for factors that could affect a mother’s fertility and her son
preference, such as age at the time of the child’s birth, literacy, and religion. The type of house the
family resides in (whether the construction of the house is considered weak, semi-strong, or strong)
is included as a proxy for household income. I cluster the standard errors at the state level. The
number of clusters in the most preferred sample is small (9 states) and clustering underestimates
standard errors when there are such few groups (Cameron et al., 2008). To deal with this issue, I
6 Underreporting of dead children is a known issue in survey data. “Forgetting” of dead children is particularly
worse for girls in sex-selective cultures (Rose, 1999). Then, another reason for limiting the sample to surviving
children is that underreporting of female children is unlikely for children who are alive. Nevertheless, the inclusion
of children who have died yields similar results.
7 As sex selection does not generally occur at birth order 1, an argument for comparing birth order 2 to birth
order 3 and greater can be made to better capture trends in sex selection. Results in this analysis are robust to
comparing birth order 2 children to birth order 3 or greater children.
8 Results are also robust to including state-specific linear time trends.
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also present p-values testing the null hypothesis that the true effect is zero using wild bootstrap-t
methods discussed in Cameron et al. (2008). The validity of a DD design assumes that once all
other variables are controlled for, trends in high and low birth order ratios are identical and that
they would remain identical in absence of the law change. Evidence supporting this assumption is
presented in Section 7.2.
While the law change could be viewed as exogenous, a state’s ability to choose when to have
an election following the law introduces issues of endogeneity. Since the timing of the first election
and sex selection within a state may be correlated, Equation (1.1) may not reveal a causal effect.
To deal with this issue of endogeneity, I limit the analysis to states that are behaving in a law
abiding manner and have elections by 1995. For reasons mentioned earlier, I also exclude Orissa,
Maharashtra and Haryana from the preferred sample. Nevertheless, I present results for all states
for comparison.
1.6.2 District Panchayat Reservations
A key feature of the 73rd Amendment is that female seat reservations were assigned at
random in most states. Since fertility data from the DLHS provide district identifiers, I am able to
exploit the random assignment of female chairpersons at the district Panchayat. I present results
from using district Panchayat reservation status from Rajasthan, West Bengal, Gujarat, Andhra
Pradesh, and Kerala. These are the states in the main sample for which I have district Panchayat
reservation status on the first election. Using district level data, I estimate a DDD model described
in Equation (1.2). It is analogous to Equation (1.1) in that it interacts treatment with birth order
and a post election variable. Additionally, Equation (1.2) exploits variation in district chairperson
reservation status. As such, the DD terms are also interacted with the main effect of whether the
district was reserved for a woman chairperson in the first election. I estimate the equation for
a sample of children born between 1990 and before the second round of elections that reserved
seats for women. This allows me to cleanly identify the effect of the district Panchayat chairperson
reservation on the likelihood that the child is male, as the control group have never been reserved
before. As mentioned above, district Panchayat offices are located in urban district headquarters,
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but do not control services or spending in those areas. Additionally, local newspapers often report
developments occuring at the district Panchayat. Given that readership of newspapers is much
greater in urban areas, access to newspapers also increases exposure to district Panchayat leaders
in urban versus rural areas.9 Then if the underlying mechanism of the effect of female reservations
on sex ratios is simply exposure to women leaders and not a change in access to services, urban
populations could be affected by reservations. Hence, I estimate Equation (1.2) for both urban and
rural populations separately.
Boyidc = β1I(Order ≥ 3)i ×Reservedd × Postdc + β2I(Order = 2)i ×Reservedd × Postdc
+β3Reservedd × Postdc + β4I(Order ≥ 3)i ×Reservedd + β5I(Order = 2)i ×Reservedd
+β6I(Order ≥ 3)i × Postdc + β7I(Order = 2)i × Postdc + β8I(Order ≥ 3)i
+β9I(Order = 2)i + β10Postc + γc + ρd + ΓXidc + idc
(1.2)
The dependent variable is an indicator for whether child i, of district d, and of birth year cohort
c is a boy, and it is regressed on the interaction of whether the chairperson seat at the district
Panchayat was reserved for a woman, Reservedd, with whether the child is born after the district
reservations were made, Postdc, and also the birth order of the child. The double interactions,
and the main effects of the DDD model are also included. The model includes birth year and
district fixed effects. Note that the main effect of reservation, Reservedd, drops out because the
model includes district fixed effects. Additional controls for mother’s age at time of birth, mother’s
literacy, mother’s religion, and the type of house the household resides in are also included in
Xidc. Assuming randomization occurs successfully, a causal effect of a female leader at the district
Panchayat on the likelihood that the child is a boy can be determined. Randomization would entail
that the districts with chairperson seats that were eventually reserved for women did not exhibit
differential sex selection at higher birth orders before the reservations actually went into place.
That is, randomization requires that β4 and β5 are not statistically different from zero. I find this
9 The 2005-2006 NFHS data reveal that 70 percent of the men in rural areas who were 20 years of age or older in
1995 read a newspaper with less frequency than once a week. The analogous ratio for men of the same age distribution
was only 30 percent in urban areas. Similar estimates for women age 20 or older in 1995 reveals that 85 percent of
them in rural areas read a newspaper with less frequency than once a week. However, amongst women that were of
age 20 or older in 1995, 57 percent of them read a newspaper with less frequency than once a week in urban areas.
This suggests that readership of newspapers around the law change was much more prevalent in urban areas making
urban areas more aware of the female leaders at the district level Panchayat.
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to be the case.
1.7 Results
1.7.1 Sex Ratios
Table 1.5 presents the main results that estimate Equation (1.1). Column 1 reports the
results from estimating the equation for all eighteen of the states in Table 1.1. For the entire
sample, a child born at the third or higher birth order after a state reserved seats for women is
about 1.28 percentage points less likely to be a boy, while children born before the law change
were 1.85 percentage points more likely to be a boy if they were born at the highest birth order.
This decline in high birth order sex ratio for the entire sample is statistically significant at the five
percent level.10 Column 2 limits the sample to states that were law abiding and had their first
election by 1995. For these states, children born at the highest birth order prior to the law change
are 2.22 percentage points more likely to be a boy in comparison to first birth order children. The
likelihood that the child is a boy at the highest birth order declines by 1.89 percentage points if
the child is born after the state had elections that reserved seats for women in compliance with
the 73rd Amendment. Column 3 limits the sample to law abiding states and excludes the states
of Orissa, Haryana, and Maharashtra for reasons discussed above. This leads to a larger reduction
in high birth order sex selection (2.63 percentage points). While children of the highest birth
order born prior to female seat reservations were nearly 2.58 percentage points more likely to be
male, the reduction of the likelihood that the child is a boy by 2.63 percentage points following
reservations offsets the excess higher birth order sex selection. Finally, Column 4 further restricts
the sample and compares changes in sex ratios for children born right around the law change, or
those born between 1991 and 1995. When looking for an effect right around the law change, I find
10 Note that the estimate for Post, while still identified with the inclusion of birth year fixed effect, does not have
the typical interpretation of a difference-in-difference model. With the inclusion of birth year fixed effects, Post
captures the change in the likelihood of a child being a boy if the child is born in a month after his/her state reserved
a seat for a woman in the year of election. In that sense, Post cannot be seen as additive to (Order ≥ 3)i×Post to get
a total effect of policy on high birth order sex selection. In fact, when birth year fixed effects are not included in the
model, the estimated effect of Post is 0.002 and also statistically insignificant, and the additive effect is statistically
different from zero.
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that high birth order children are 3.91 percentage points less likely to be a boy. Finding a similar
effect in a such a narrow window is reassuring as it can more plausibly be argued that changes in
unobservables following reservations for women are not explaining the effect. Although previous
literature finds that the Indian ban on ultrasound did not deter prenatal sex selection, finding an
effect within the birth year window of 1991 and 1995 is also evidence that the enforcement of the
ban in 1996 does not explain the effect.
Table 1.5: Birth Order-specific change in share of boys
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES boy boy boy boy
I(Order ≥ 3)× Post Reserve -0.0128** -0.0189** -0.0263*** -0.0391***
(0.00586) (0.00649) (0.00498) (0.00987)
I(Order = 2)× Post Reserve -0.00183 -0.00267 -0.00783 -0.0190
(0.00556) (0.00627) (0.00698) (0.0199)
Post Reserve 0.00848 0.0108 0.0216 0.0280
(0.00775) (0.0124) (0.0161) (0.0203)
I(Order ≥ 3) 0.0185*** 0.0222*** 0.0258*** 0.0256**
(0.00406) (0.00441) (0.00359) (0.00779)
I(Order = 2) 0.00709* 0.00660 0.00951* 0.0111
(0.00388) (0.00459) (0.00445) (0.00682)
Reservations by 1995? No Yes Yes Yes
Orissa, Maharashtra & Haryana Included? Yes Yes No No
Birth Years 1987-2004 1987-2004 1987-2004 1991-1995
N States 18 12 9 9
Wild Bootstrap-t p-value 0.062 0.042 0.00 0.014
on I(Birth Order ≥ 3)× Post
Observations 531,849 391,686 302,626 89,772
Sample weights used. Sample restricted to surviving children of rural areas. State clustered standard errors.
All specifications include birth year, state, mother’s age at time of birth, mother’s literacy, mother’s religion,
and type of house fixed effects.
P-value reported for I(Order ≥ 3) × Post Reserve using wild bootstrap-t methods as discussed in Cameron
et al. (2008) with 999 repetitions.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
In Columns 3 and 4, the number of states is reduced to 9 states. Bertrand et al. (2004) shows
that clustering yields over-rejection of the null hypothesis of no effect when the number of clusters
falls below 10. Cameron et al. (2008) proposes a solution and presents wild bootstrap-t techniques
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for when the number of clusters is small. I present the p-value for the coefficient of interest using
the wild bootstrap-t techniques of Cameron et al. (2008). This method rejects the null of a zero
effect at the one and the five percent level in Columns 3 and 4 respectively, when the number of
clusters are reduced to 9.
These results are consistent with the prior that the involvement of females in politics could
reduce gender preference and sex selection. In general, I find that children born at the highest birth
order are less likely to be a boy if they are born after the state requires local Panchayat positions to
be held by women. To validate these results, next, I rule out the claim that there was a pre-existing
trend of declining high birth order sex selection before reservations for women went into effect.
1.7.2 Trends
1.7.2.a Falsification Tests A difference-in-difference estimation relies on the assumption
that in the absence of a policy change, trends between the treatment and the control groups would
have remained identical. I provide supporting evidence for this claim by testing whether the trends
in the ratio of boys at birth order 1 is identical to that of higher birth order children before
reservations for women were made. Table 1.6 presents results from performing falsification tests
that investigate whether the estimation of Equation (1.1) yields an effect for placebo-treatment
years prior to the law change. If trends prior to the law change are not different across birth order,
I expect the effect of a “treatment” year prior to the law change to be zero. Table 1.6 estimates
Equation (1.1) for a sample of surviving children of rural India born between 1987 and 1992 in states
that had their first election reserving seats for women by 1995 while excluding Orissa, Maharashtra,
and Haryana. Specifically I test for whether there are statistically significant changes in the share
of boys across different birth order children born in or after 1988, 1989, 1990 and 1991 separately in
Columns 1 through 4 respectively. Since seats for women have not yet been reserved for a sample
of children born between 1987 and 1992, I expect that the birth order-specific share of boys does
not vary over time. Results of Table 1.6 show that within the set of children born prior to when
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reservations for women went into effect, higher birth order children are not statistically less likely to
be a boy if they are born in or after different placebo-treatment years. Finding no effect in a time
period we do not expect one suggests that the main results are not just capturing a pre-existing
decline in higher birth order male preference.11
Table 1.6: Falsification Tests: Birth Order-specific change in share of boys
(1) (2) (3) (4)
VARIABLES boy boy boy boy
I(Order ≥ 3)× Post 0.00124 -0.0115 -0.00250 0.00186
(0.0165) (0.00619) (0.00897) (0.0117)
I(Order = 2)× Post -0.00707 -0.000960 -0.00126 0.00522
(0.0197) (0.0110) (0.00695) (0.00629)
I(Order ≥ 3) 0.0330** 0.0423*** 0.0354*** 0.0334***
(0.0136) (0.00775) (0.00908) (0.00836)
I(Order = 2) 0.0179 0.0124 0.0124 0.00980**
(0.0184) (0.0115) (0.00730) (0.00390)
Post Year 1988 1989 1990 1991
Observations 86,458 86,458 86,458 86,458
Sample weights used. State clustered standard errors. All specifications include
birth year, state, mother’s age at time of birth, mother’s literacy, mother’s religion,
and type of house fixed effects. Sample restricted to rural areas of states that
reserve seats for women by 1995, excluding Haryana, Maharashtra, and Orissa.
Sample of surviving children born between 1987 and 1992.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1.7.2.b Decomposing the Effect by Years-Since the First Election
Although Table 1.6 helps establish that there was no downward trend already occurring in
high birth order sex selection, treatment defined in the main specification does not occur at a
fixed time, but at various times that states have relevant elections. To investigate a trend more in
line with the DD design, I investigate heterogeneous effects across time since election. Figure 1.4
presents the coefficient estimates from Equation (1.1) for children born at birth orders 3 or greater,
while allowing the effect to vary depending on how many years since the election the child is born.
11 Although the number of clusters is small, I do not estimate p-values using wild bootstrap-t methods as in the
main results of Table 1.5. Since clustering when the number of groups is smaller than 10 underestimates standard
errors, not finding an effect when clustering at the state level is more conservative in ruling out a pre-existing trend.
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These coefficient estimates are provided for the preferred sample which includes states that have
elections by 1995, while excluding Orissa, Maharashtra, and Haryana. The graph shows coefficient
estimates of changes in sex ratios for children born 6 years prior to the election up to children
born 8 years following the election. Also shown are the 95 percent confidence intervals for each
point estimate. The omitted category consists of first born children born 7 years prior to a relevant
election. The graph shows that the estimated change in the likelihood of a high birth order male
born prior to when reservations are made are boys fluctuates around -0.02, however immediately
following seat reservations for women went into effect, this estimate begins to fluctuate around -0.04.
This suggests the likelihood that a high birth order child is male declined soon after reservations
for women were made, and that the decline in sex ratios remained relatively persistent at least up
until 8 years following the time seats for women were reserved. Additionally, it can be seen that a
95 percent confidence interval does not reject a zero effect for children born prior to reservations.
However, the decline reported for children born 1, 2, 3, 5, 6, and 8 years following reservations is
statistically different from zero with 95 percent confidence.
Figure 1.5 shows similar years-from-election point estimates of Equation 1.1 for birth order 2.
There is no obvious decline in the estimated effect for boys born at birth order 2 following the law
change. The graph appears nearly symmetric, verifying the findings of Table 1.5 that reservations
for women did not lead to a decline in the likelihood that a child is a boy at the second birth
order. Additionally the null hypothesis of a zero effect cannot be rejected at the 95 percent level
for children born in the entire window between 6 years prior and 8 years since the timing of election.
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Figure 1.4: Figure shows the coefficient estimates of the change in the likelihood of a third or
higher birth order child being a boy if the child is born at different # of years since first reservation
of seats for women. Omitted category is children born 7 years prior to the implementation of
reservations for women. Sample restricted to rural areas of states that reserved seats by 1995,
excluding Haryana, Orissa, and Maharashtra.
Figure 1.5: Figure shows the coefficient estimates of the change in the likelihood of a second birth
order child being a boy if the child is born at different # of years since first reservation of seats for
women. Omitted category is children born 7 years prior to the implementation of reservations for
women. Sample restricted to rural areas of states that reserved seats by 1995, excluding Haryana,
Orissa, and Maharashtra.
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1.7.3 District level Reservations
Table 1.7 shows the estimates from Equation (1.2) that studies the impact of actual reser-
vations at the district Panchayat for urban and rural areas. Despite the fact that the district
Panchayat is responsible for rural and not urban development, district Panchayat offices are lo-
cated in urban district headquarters, and as such it is possible that reservations at the district
Panchayat could also affect urban populations through increased exposure to female leaders. Ad-
ditionally, developments at the district Panchayat are reported in local newspapers. Due to higher
readership of newspapers in urban areas, newspaper coverage also makes the district Panchayat
more visible in urban areas. Thus, unlike all of the other estimation results in this paper thus far
that only study rural areas (where the 73rd Amendment applied), when studying the direct effect
of district Panchayat reservations, I focus on differential effects in urban and rural communities.
Column 1 presents the estimation results for rural areas, and I do not find that district chairperson
reservations for women had a statistically significant impact on the likelihood that a child is a boy.
In urban areas, however, female district chairperson reservations lead to a 6.47 percentage points
decline in the share of boys for children born at the highest birth order (Column 2). While other
studies confirm that the root of the effect of female reservations in line with the 73rd Amendment
most likely lies in female reservations at lower level Panchayats, here I find evidence that the district
Panchayat reservations had heterogenous effects across urban and rural areas.
Note that the coefficients on I(Order ≥ 3) × Reserved and I(Order = 2) × Reserved are
statistically indistinguishable from zero. This suggests that district Panchayat chairpersons reser-
vations were as good as random, because the share of boys at high birth orders were not statistically
different in districts that eventually reserved seats for women prior to when reservations were made.
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Table 1.7: The effect of first district level Panchayat election
(1) (2)
VARIABLES boy boy
Rural Urban
I(Order ≥ 3)×Reservedd × Post 0.0440 -0.0647**
(0.0272) (0.0314)
I(Order = 2)×Reservedd × Post 0.0299 -0.00144
(0.0264) (0.0490)
Reservedd × Post -0.0200 -0.0181
(0.0195) (0.0431)
I(Order ≥ 3)× Post -0.0549*** 0.0454**
(0.0159) (0.0184)
I(Order = 2)× Post -0.0275* 0.0297
(0.0163) (0.0207)
I(Order ≥ 3)×Reservedd -0.00722 0.0144
(0.0187) (0.0244)
I(Order = 2)×Reservedd -0.0177 0.0207
(0.0195) (0.0248)
I(Order ≥ 3) 0.0308** 0.0172
(0.0136) (0.0213)
I(Order = 2) 0.0211* -0.0121
(0.0108) (0.0164)
Post 0.0370** -0.0151
(0.0147) (0.0287)
N Districts 102 102
Observations 64,014 26,483
District clustered standard errors. All specifications include district,
birth year, mother’s age at time of birth, mother’s literacy, mother’s
religion, and type of house fixed effects. Sample consists the states of
Rajasthan, West Bengal, Gujarat, Andhra Pradesh, and Kerala. Sam-
ple restricted to surviving children born after 1990 until first district
reservations were in effect.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1.8 Robustness Checks
1.8.1 Sex Selective Deaths
Sex selection in India often still occurs after birth and prenatal choices such as sex-selective
abortions are less common (Das Gupta et al., 2003). Thus, I expect to find that some of the
changes in sex ratios are explained by changes in death rates. As high birth order girls experience
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higher levels of discrimination, any decline in death rates by age one for all girls will likely be
disproportionately greater for girls born at high birth orders. Equation (1.3) studies the impact
of Panchayat elections following the 73rd Amendment on gender and birth order-specific reported
death by age one rates.
Diedics = β1I(Order ≥ 3)i × Postcs ×Girli + β2I(Order = 2)i × Postcs ×Girli
+β3Postcs ×Girli + β4I(Order ≥ 3)i × Postcs + β5I(Order = 2)i × Postcs
+β6I(Order ≥ 3)i ×Girli + β7I(Order = 2)i ×Girli + β8Postcs + β9Girli
+β10I(Order ≥ 3)i + β11I(Order = 2)i + γs + θc + ΓXics + ics
(1.3)
I estimate a difference-in-difference-in-difference (DDD) model with the three differences being
across birth order, whether the child is born before or after reservations are made, and the gender
of child. Diedisc is a dummy variable indicating that child i, of birth cohort c, in state s, has died
before age one. It is regressed on the interaction of whether the child is born after the state had
a relevant election with a dummy variable for whether the child is a girl and also interacted with
whether the child is born at a high birth order. Here, β1 indicates the additional change in the
probability (in percentage points) of death for high birth order females, relative to that of high
birth order males, born after reservations for women are made. Additional controls are as described
in Equation (1.1).
Table 1.8 presents the results from estimating Equation (1.3). I find that in comparison to
higher birth order boys born after the law change, higher birth order girls are significantly less likely
to be reported dead by their first birthday by approximately 0.99 percentage points if they are born
after their state had an election that reserved Panchayat seats for women. Applying methods of
wild bootstrap-t to account for a small amount of clusters yields a p-value of 0.062.
Results in Table 1.8 show that girls in general are less likely to be reported as dead, as the
coefficient on Girl is negative and statistically significant. High birth order girls, however, are
significantly more likely to be reported as dead. While one may suspect that this is just a fertility
effect and that high birth order children come from larger families so they are more likely to die,
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Table 1.8: Gender-specific change in death by age one rates
(1)
VARIABLES died by age ≤ 1
I(Order ≥ 3)× Post×Girl -0.00989**
(0.00363)
I(Order = 2)× Post×Girl -0.00007
(0.00360)
Post×Girl 0.00263
(0.00317)
Post -0.00539*
(0.00261)
I(Order ≥ 3)× Post 0.00983***
(0.00217)
I(Order = 2)× Post 0.00409
(0.00286)
I(Order ≥ 3)×Girl 0.0165***
(0.00265)
I(Order = 2)×Girl 0.00386
(0.00214)
Girl -0.0120***
(0.00227)
I(Order ≥ 3) -0.0163***
(0.00211)
I(Order = 2) -0.0105***
(0.00282)
Wild Bootstrap-t p-value 0.062
on I(Birth Order ≥ 3)× Post×Girl
Observations 339,283
Sample weights used. Sample restricted to rural areas of states
that reserve seats for women by 1995, excluding Haryana,
Maharashtra, and Orissa. Sample of children born between
1987-2004. State clustered standard errors. All specifica-
tions include birth year, state, mother’s age at time of birth,
mother’s literacy, mother’s religion, and type of house fixed effects.
P-value reported for I(Birth Order ≥ 3) × Post × Girl using
methods of wild bootstrap-t, as discussed in Cameron et al. (2008),
with 999 repetitions.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
the same is not true for boys. Since first birth order boys are the omitted category, the estimated
coefficient on I(Order ≥ 3) and I(Order = 2) provide the differential in death by age one rates
33
for high birth order boys in comparison to boys born at birth order 1. Negative and statistically
significant coefficients on high birth order fixed effects indicate that high birth order boys are less
likely to be reported dead by age one than first born boys. Both high death rates for high birth
order girls and low death rates for high birth order boys are consistent with high birth order sex
selection.
Also, note that coefficients on I(Order ≥ 3)×Post and I(Order = 2)×Post are not negative.
This is important because it implies that the reduction in sex ratios is not likely explained by
improved health care for all children provided by female leaders. If this were the case, then health
improvements should also be observed for higher birth order boys. Instead, I find that reported
deaths for higher birth order boys increased after female leaders are brought into power. This
may appear somewhat shocking, but since higher birth order boys were 1.63 percentage points less
likely to die by age one, the increase in death rates following reservations by 0.99 percentage points
implies that the disproportion that existed in the death rates for high birth order boys declines.
Overall, it does not appear that increased investments in the health of children or the provision of
public goods associated with the involvement of women in politics explain the results.
1.8.2 Ultrasound ban in 1996
India’s ban on ultrasound was enforced starting in January of 1996 (Arnold et al., 2002).
Column 4 of Table 1.5 finds an effect for children born prior to the enforcement of the ban, suggesting
that the ban does not explain the effect reported in this analysis. Here, I provide further evidence
that the effect of reduced sex selection in the main analysis is not explained by the enforcement of
the ban on ultrasound. I estimate the differential in high birth order sex ratios for children born in
or after 1996 while controlling for the time when reservations for women were made. These results
for the preferred sample of states that have an election by 1995 excluding Orissa, Maharashtra, and
Haryana are presented in Table 1.9. In fact, once the effect for being born following reservations is
controlled for, the positive coefficient on the effect of the legal ban in 1996 suggests that the ban
may be associated with an increase in sex ratios. This is consistent with the literature suggesting
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that sex ratios in India have continued to rise regardless of the ban.12 Note that since the sample
consists of states that have an election that first reserve seats for women by 1995, Post 1996 does not
coincide with timing of first election that reserved seats for women in this particular specification.
Table 1.9: Differential effect after ultrasound ban in 1996?
(1)
VARIABLES boy
I(Order ≥ 3)× Post Reserve -0.0387***
(0.0106)
I(Order = 2)× Post Reserve -0.0181
(0.0192)
Post Reserve 0.0297
(0.0199)
I(Order ≥ 3)× Post 1996 0.0143
(0.00789)
I(Order = 2)× Post 1996 0.0117
(0.0175)
I(Order ≥ 3) 0.0257***
(0.00359)
I(Order = 2) 0.00947*
(0.00444)
Observations 302,626
Sample weights used. State clustered stan-
dard errors. All specifications include state,
mother’s age at time of birth, mother’s literacy,
mother’s religion, and type of house fixed ef-
fects. Sample restricted to rural areas of states
that have elections within 2 years of the 73rd
Amendment, excluding Haryana, Maharashtra,
and Orissa. Sample of surviving children born
in rural areas between 1987 and 2004.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
1.8.3 The West Bengal Case
An additional robustness check considers the impact of reservations in West Bengal, the
single state in which Panchayat elections have operated in a regular fashion. The state has held
12 While 1996 is associated with an increase in the share of boys, the effect of seat reservations does not dissipate
entirely after 1996 and the sum of the two effects, or the total effect of post-reservations, is statistically different from
zero at the five percent level.
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a Panchayat election every 5 years since 1978 and its election following the 73rd Amendment was
also 5 years after its previous election. Thus, timing of the state of West Bengal’s election can be
more confidently argued to be exogenous. Table 1.10 presents the estimation of Equation (1.1) for
the state of West Bengal alone. Within the state of West Bengal, children born at birth orders
3 or greater after reservations are 5.37 percentage points less likely to be a boy. There is also a
reduction in second order sex ratios following reservations by 3.55 percentage points. The model
includes birth year fixed effects and standard errors are clustered at the district level.13
Table 1.10: Birth Order-specific change in ratio of boys. West Bengal only
(1)
VARIABLES boy
I(Order ≥ 3)× Post Reserve -0.0537***
(0.0152)
I(Order = 2)× Post Reserve -0.0355*
(0.0168)
Post Reserve 0.0920**
(0.0359)
I(Order ≥ 3) 0.0383**
(0.0136)
I(Order = 2) 0.0109
(0.0140)
Observations 18,514
Sample weights used. Sample of surviving children
born between 1987-2004 in rural areas of West Ben-
gal. District clustered standard errors. All spec-
ifications include district, mother’s age at time of
birth, mother’s literacy, mother’s religion, and type
of house fixed effects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
13 Treatment occurs in May 1993 for West Bengal. With the inclusion of birth year fixed effects, while still identified
because treatment is defined at both month and year, the meaning of the coefficient on Post Reservation is not that
of a typical difference-in-difference model. The estimate on Post Reservation can be interpreted as the difference in
the likelihood of having a boy if the child is born after the month of May in 1993. It can be seen that, of the children
born in 1993, children are nearly 6 percentage points more likely to be boy if the are born in the months after May.
This suggests this effect is likely driven by seasonality. Results in this paper are robust to the inclusion of month
fixed effects.
36
1.9 Possible Mechanisms
I argue that the underlying mechanism behind these results is exposure to female leaders,
which shifts parent’s beliefs regarding what their daughters can achieve. I provide direct evidence
supporting this claim and refute alternative hypotheses. For example, one might argue that invest-
ments in public health associated with female leadership would disproportionately help the health
of marginal children (high birth order girls), and this could be driving the results. However, it can
be seen in Table 1.8 that reservation of women did not result in an overall improvement of health
for other children. There is no evidence that the timing of elections improves overall health of boys
born at high birth orders. Furthermore, estimates for the effect of reservations on higher birth
order-specific death rates for boys are positive, suggesting that reservations did not lead to better
overall health for all children.
Another potential mechanism refuted by these results is that the movement to decentralize
power to local governments led to improved provision of health services at the local level. While
reservations for women and the devolution of powers coincide in most states, the West Bengal case
establishes that the latter is not driving the change in sex selection. West Bengal devolved powers
and established a functioning Panchayat system of government at the local level well before the
passage of the 73rd Amendment, however reservations for women were not made until after the
passage of the Amendment. Finding an effect for a state that had already set up a form of local
governments suggests that the mechanism is not solely explained by devolving government power
to the local level.
Additional support for the mechanism being exposure to female leaders lies in the results
from investigating the impact of district level Panchayat reservations on sex ratios. The duties
of the district Panchayat focused on development of rural populations, however, the main offices
of the district Panchayat are located in the district headquarters, which are largely urban areas.
Moreover readership of newspapers, in which activities of the district Panchayat are often reported,
is much greater in urban areas, suggesting that exposure to women leaders is higher in urban areas.
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I find reservations at the district Panchayat did not impact the rural population, but led to a
decrease in high birth order share of boys for the urban population. This implies that changes in
sex ratios were not a part of a particular development strategy, otherwise rural and not urban areas
would be impacted. Finding that urban and not rural areas are affected by district Panchayat
reservations is suggestive that the underlying mechanism is increased exposure to important female
leaders that would have been more directly visible in urban areas. Altogether, evidence in this
article suggests that the likely mechanism is exposure to female leaders, and neither a change in
spending that disproportionately helps high birth order females or devolution of powers to the local
government likely explains the effect. Exposure to female leaders could have altered parent’s beliefs
regarding women’s ability to earn income, or it could alter views towards women more generally
from seeing women in positions of power. While the results indicate that exposure to female leaders
is important, they are unable to distinguish between how the beliefs may have been altered.
1.10 Conclusion
This paper shows that the share of boys at high birth order declines for children born following
the implementation of local political seat reservations for women in rural India. I also find that
reported death rates for higher birth order girls decline. My findings are consistent with the prior
that female political empowerment can reduce gender bias, and hence sex selection. The results
in this analysis are also robust to various tests. The source of the effect in rural areas appears to
be reservations for women closest to home, at the village level or the block level Panchayat. This
is indicative that exposure to female leaders is important. In addition, I find that reservations at
the district level decreased sex ratios in urban India and not in rural India. These results further
validate the idea that visibility of female leaders is of greatest importance in the relationship
between sex selection and female reservations, as the female leaders of the district level Panchayat
are more visible to the urban population due to newspaper readership and the location of the district
Panchayat buildings. I argue that other mechanisms, such as improvements in health services or
devolving of powers to the local government are not likely driving the effect.
38
These results also shed light on previous findings in the literature on sex selection. Kalsi
(2014) shows that sex selection in Taiwan is more prevalent following the legalization of abortion,
and that girls born at high birth orders are more likely to attend a university if they are born
following the legalization of abortion. This result is consistent with the hypothesis that prenatal
and postnatal discriminations are substitutes (Lin et al., 2008; Goodkind, 1996) and implies that
bans on prenatal sex selection could lead to increased postnatal sex selection, postnatal female
discrimination, and the prevalence of dangerous illegal abortions. A better way to deal with the
issue would be to target the underlying son preference that leads to sex selection by addressing the
status of women directly. This research provides an example of one such policy, the reservation of
local seats for women, that is shown to reduce the prevalence of sex selection.
Chapter 2
Abortion Legalization, Sex Selection, and Female University Enrollment in
Taiwan
2.1 Introduction
While the natural sex ratio at birth (henceforth SRB) is between 105 and 106 boys per
100 girls, a SRB as high as 110 has been observed in Taiwan (Chu and Yu, 2010). Sex selection
is known to be the cause of unusually high male to female sex ratios in many Asian countries.
Sex selection occurs either prenatally when there are gender-based abortions or postnatally when
relatively worse care for infants results in higher death rates for children of the less preferred
gender. Families in these societies prefer male children over female children for two reasons: (1)
they desire to preserve the family name and (2) in many Asian countries, sons are more likely
to financially support parents (Goldman et al., 2003). Nations with particularly high SRB have
expressed concerns regarding unbalanced sex ratios and, although often not strictly enforced, some
have placed legal bans on the practice of sex selection. India, for example, banned sex detection
tests in 1994, and similar policies are in place in China and South Korea (Vogel, 2012). While
there are clear inefficiencies from high sex ratios such as marriage markets failing to clear, other
implications of sex selection are not as obvious nor clearly deleterious. Studies have found improved
early life female health outcomes after families are able to make endogenous gender-based abortion
decisions (Lin, Liu, and Qian 2008; Dasgupta 2010). This paper focuses on a later life economic
outcome and provides evidence that the legalization of abortion, hence sex selection, also increased
the average level of university attainment for women in Taiwan.
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The substitution hypothesis, as outlined by Daniel Goodkind in 1996, posits that increasing
prenatal discrimination results in decreased postnatal discrimination, or that prenatal and postnatal
discrimination are substitutes. Because many families who have low preferences for a girl will
choose to abort, an average girl born after the legalization of abortion is born into a family who
has a stronger desire for her in comparison to an average girl born before abortion is made legal.
Although fewer in number, girls born in a sex-selective society with legalized abortion will be, on
average, more desired than girls born before the legalization of abortion. Since boys are almost
always desired in a society with male preference, the availability of sex-selective abortion does not
drastically shift the composition of families who have boys towards those who desire them more.1
I investigate whether the ability to prenatally sex select through legal abortion and sex
detecting technology in a society with a male preference improves the average level of investments
in female children. I focus on university attendance in Taiwan as a measure of investment.2 Since
university tuition is a cost often borne by parents, university attendance signals high investments
in a child.3 Moreover, children that attend a university are more likely to have had early life
investments such as private schooling, more parental attention, and better health care.4
Following Lin et al. (2008), I exploit the legalization of abortion in Taiwan as a policy that
exogenously increased sex selection at the highest birth orders in Taiwan. As in Lin et al. (2008), I
use both the variation in sex selection across birth orders as well as the variation over time (before
1 If there are families that strictly have a preference for a girl and they abort male children to increase chances of
a female birth, then a similar compositional shift would be observed for boys and an average boy born after abortion
legalization will also be born into a family that desires him more. Given that the society under consideration has a
male preference, the compositional change of families in favor of boys is small, if any at all. Results in this paper find
this to be the case, and I do not find any evidence suggesting that such a compositional shift occurs for males.
2 This study does not investigate changes in enrollments into other realms of education such as junior college or
high school. In the period under consideration, junior college enrollment is on the decline while enrollment into a
four-year university is on the rise, suggesting that nationally there is some substitution from junior college into the
more costly form of education, in both time and money. Then it is not clear whether increased enrollment into junior
college is indeed an increase in investments. Also, high school or equivalent education completion in the sample under
consideration is almost universal, leaving too little variation to identify changes in high school completion.
3 Costs of university tuition for 2003-2004 were $NT 58,714 for public universities and $NT 107,360 for private
universities (approximately 24 percent and 44 percent of personal income per capita for public and private universities
respectively). Source: Ministry of Education: Republic of China (Taiwan).
4 Behrman et al. (2009) find that an 8 year long nutrition intervention in Guatemala led to an increase in later
life educational attainment for children who were under the age of 7 during the intervention. A quarter of a century
later, women had completed 1.2 higher grades and both men and women had a quarter of a standard deviation higher
scores in reading and comprehension tests.
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and after the legalization of abortion) to estimate a difference-in-differences model to determine
whether abortion legalization increased the average rate of university attendance of higher birth
order girls. I find that abortion legalization in Taiwan results in an increase in the university
enrollment rate of the second and higher birth order girl by about 4.5 percentage points, while
no increase is observed for a second or higher birth order boy. The next section provides a brief
overview of abortion policy in Taiwan.
2.2 Background
Taiwan legalized abortion on January 1st of 1985 under the Eugenic Health Law in response
to a feminist movement, which demanded the legalization of safe abortions (Lin et al., 2008). The
law legalized abortions for fetal, maternal, or social reasons during the first 6 months of gestation
(Chiang, 2005). Then by law, children born prior to the first 4 months of 1985 could be not have
been aborted, and 1986 was the first full year in which children could have been sex selected. Prior
to 1985, abortion in Taiwan was only legal in cases of rape or if the fetus had a genetic disorder (Lin
et al., 2008). At the time, contraception use was high and fertility rates were declining. In 1965,
an extensive and highly effective family planning program under the Taiwan Provincial Institute of
Family Planning was introduced, and by 1985, 95 percent of all married women in Taiwan had used
some form of contraception (Chu and Yu, 2010). Ultrasound technology had also been present in
Taiwan since its introduction worldwide in the early 1980s (Lin et al., 2008). The cost of abortion
during the 1980s was roughly 1 percent of an average household’s income (Lin et al., 2008).
Abortion in Taiwan is used to both control fertility and to sex select. Using data from
Knowledge, Attitudes, and Practice of Contraception in Taiwan: Family and Fertility Survey (KAP
Survey), Lin, Liu, and Qian show that the percentage of women who have ever had an abortion
increased from 23 percent in 1985 to approximately 27 percent in 1992. The KAP survey does not
specify whether the abortions were performed for medical or other reasons, and this distinction
cannot be determined from the data (Lin et al., 2008). This increase may not seem very large,
but the KAP surveys are self-reported and it is possible that individuals underreport abortions.
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Additionally Lin, Liu and Qian also note that the number of doctors with registered ultrasound
machines increased from 557 to 3027 from 1984 to 1989. Since abortion combined with ultrasound
technology allows termination of pregnancy based on gender preferences, the legalization of abortion
in Taiwan presents an exogenous shift in families’ sex selection abilities. I exploit the variation
created by the law change and investigate the effect of the legalization of abortion on the level of
gender-specific investment in education for children. The next section discusses the data.
2.3 The Data
I use the Taiwan Family Income/Expenditure Survey, a nationally representative survey of
randomly selected registered households in Taiwan. These data can be requested from Survey
Research Data Archive (SRDA). My main analysis uses survey years 1996 to 2010 and focuses
on children who are of college-age and born between 1978 and 1992. Between 13,000 and 15,000
households are surveyed each year. Although some households are repeated in different surveys,
unique identifiers for households are not provided; hence the analysis treats the data as a cross-
section over time. A household is defined as a group of individuals sharing a home. Additionally,
individuals are considered part of a household if they contribute at least 50 percent of their income
to the household or have at least 50 percent of their expenditures paid by the family. For example,
college students who are financially supported by their families but no longer live at home are
included, and financially independent children not living at home are not. Furthermore, for each
member of the household, I observe age, sex, the relationship to the head of the household, and the
highest level of education attempted. Using the year of the survey and the age of the individual, I
extrapolate a year of birth for each individual. Using the age of the individual and their relationship
to the head, I also extrapolate the birth order of child. Due to the fact that some of the children
are not observed in the sample, birth order is sometimes mis-specified. Details of birth order
mis-specification are discussed in the next section.
My main analysis is limited to cohorts born within a 14-year window around the legalization
of abortion in 1985. This sample is also limited to children between the ages of 18 and 24. This
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Table 2.1: Summary statistics by birth year
Pre-reform Post-reform
Birth Years 1978-1984 1985-1992
Variable Mean Mean Diff
Mean age of children 13.84 13.22 -0.59***
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
No. of children 2.48 2.33 -0.15***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
No. of people 4.65 4.46 -0.19***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Mother’s age 46.26 46.81 0.56***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.04)
Income per capita $NT 303,660 314,700 10,273***
(1,084) (1,372) (1,720)
Head went to a university 0.09 0.12 0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Head is male 0.83 0.79 -0.03***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
Average Fertility Rate 2.25 1.76
All specifications use data from survey years 1996-2010. Sample
is households with children born between 1978 and 1996. Fertil-
ity data from http://eng.stat.gov.tw. Since 1981 is the first year
with reported fertility, only years 1981-1984 are used to estimate
the pre-reform average fertility. Post-reform fertility is the av-
erage fertility in Taiwan from 1985-1992. Sample weights used.
Standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
restriction is based on the fact that most of the children in the data (72 percent of them) who have
ever attended a university are between the ages of 18 to 24. Another reason to set an upper limit
on the age of children is to reduce the sample bias that may exist from including adult children
who are observed in the sample because they financially contribute to the family.5 Table 2.1
provides summary statistics at the household level for children in the sample. The table is split
across households with children born before (1978-1984) and after (1985-1992) the legalization
of abortion. I also report average fertility rates in Taiwan. Fertility data come from the National
Statistics of Republic of China’s website.6 The “pre” period reports the average fertility in Taiwan
5 Nevertheless, the results from removing the age bound at 24 are similar.
6 http://eng.stat.gov.tw.
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from the years 1981 to 1984 and the “post” period’s fertility is the nation’s average for the years
1985 to 1992.7
Of the children in the sample, those born after the legalization of abortion come from house-
holds with slightly younger and fewer children than those born prior to the legalization of abortion.
Families of children born prior to the law change average 4.65 members and 4.46 for those born
after the legalization. Mothers of children in the sample born prior to the reform are on average
46.26 years old at the time of the survey, while mothers of children born after the reform in the
sample are 46.81 at the time of the survey. Children born after the legalization of abortion come
from families that have a higher income per capita and have heads who are slightly more educated.
Since 2010 is the last survey year in the analysis, all of the children in the sample who are born in
1992 are 18 years old and only observed in the 2010 survey. Following similar logic for other survey
years in the “post” period, children born post-legalization are mechanically a little younger than
those born pre-legalization. All of the differences in means between the two periods are statistically
significant at the 1 percent level. Fertility drops from 2.25 in 1981-1984 to 1.76 in 1985-1992, and
families who have a higher order child in a time of low fertility may be very different from families
who have a higher order child prior to the legalization of abortion. For example, if at a time of lower
fertility having more children is a luxury good, then higher investments in a higher birth order child
could be independent of increased sex selection. In that case, however, the effect of abortion on
investments in higher order children would be independent of child’s gender. To account for fertility
differences, the main analysis adds additional controls for number of children in the family. I also
include controls for the mother’s age to account for the age of the family. It was discussed that
not all children are observed in the data, and as a result, birth order is sometimes mis-specified. I
explain this mis-specification in more detail in the following section.
7 1981 is the first year the National Statistics of Republic of China’s website provides the fertility rate.
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2.4 Attrition
It is important to discuss the limitations of these data, since the nature of birth order mis-
specification affects the research design. For example, birth order of a child may be incorrectly
assigned if the oldest child from the family is financially independent and no longer lives at home,
and hence is unobserved in the data. In this case, a younger child is assigned a birth order one
even though he/she is of a higher birth order. Since most children not included in the survey are
older and financially independent, the assigned birth order is likely a downward estimate of actual
birth order.
Figure 2.1 shows three distributions of birth orders for children born between 1978 and 1992
observed at 1, 10, and 18 years of age. The figure highlights attrition and shows that as the birth
cohort of interest ages in the sample, the distribution of birth orders skews more to the left. If all
children were perfectly reported regardless of death or gaining independence, the distribution of
birth orders would remain the same as the cohort ages. However, it is clear that the ratio of children
assigned birth order one is much smaller when the cohort is only one year old (33%) in comparison
to when the same birth year cohort is 18 years old (51%). This is indicative that older children
are often unobserved in the sample, as a result of which, my method of birth order assignment
under-assigns birth order for older children.
While Lin et al. (2008) established that the legalization of abortion in Taiwan increased SRB
at birth orders 3 or greater, my analysis compares first-born children with later-born children. The
reason for focusing on a different cut-off is that the main analysis focuses on educational outcomes
for adult children, for whom birth order is often under-assigned. That is, children assigned birth
order 2 will often be children of even higher birth orders, where sex selection is documented to
occur. Also because of the attrition evident in a sample of college-aged children, there are very
few observations in the main sample that are assigned birth orders 3 or higher.8 As a result, all
8 When studying the effect of abortion legalization on gender-specific university rates by each birth order separately,
a statistically significant effect is seen only at birth order 2 for which there are many more observations. Table A2
in the Appendix shows the effect at each birth order, and Table A3 in the Appendix shows that there are very
few observations (for both girls and boys) that are assigned birth orders 3 or greater and also born following the
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analysis in this paper exploits a cutoff around first-born and later-born children. A much more
detailed analysis that studies attrition at each age in the sample is discussed in the Appendix. Also
shown in the Appendix is that male versus female attrition is similar.
Figure 2.1: Distribution of birth order assignment: 1978-1992 birth year cohort observed at ages 1,
10, and 18. Shown for children up to birth order 6. Figure uses data from survey years 1978-2010.
2.5 The Effect of Abortion Legalization on Ratio of Boys
While others establish the rise of sex ratios following the legalization of abortion, I estimate
a simple difference-in-differences model to verify that the data used in this analysis also show
increases in the ratio of boys.
Boyit = β1(Order2plusit × Postt) + β2Order2plusit + β3Postt + it (2.1)
The dependent variable in Equation 2.1 is whether or not child i, born before or after the
legalization of abortion.
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legalization of abortion period t, is a boy. The independent variables are fixed effects for whether
the child is of birth order 2 or higher, Order2plusit, and its interaction with a dummy variable for
being born after the legalization of abortion, Order2plusit × Postt. The main effect of Postt is
also included. Birth order one is the omitted category, and the coefficient on Postt captures the
increase in sex ratios for first-born children born after the legalization of abortion. The result of
this estimation is provided in Table 2.2. In Column 1, I limit the sample to young children for
whom attrition and birth order mis-specification is a much smaller problem. The sample is limited
to children with the same birth years as those in the main sample (1978 to 1992) but only when
they are of age 10 or younger. I find that the ratio of boys at birth orders 2 or higher increases
by 0.012 from the baseline of 0.519. The coefficient on Postt is statistically indistinguishable from
zero, indicating that the legalization of abortion had no significant impact on the ratio of boys at
the first birth order for a sample of children younger than 10 years old.9
Column 2 restricts the sample to the population of interest, 18 to 24-year-old children with
birth years between 1978 and 1992, and I do not find a statistically significant increase in sex ratios
for higher birth order children born after the legalization of abortion in the sample of college-aged
children. This seemingly paradoxical result could be explained due to mis-specification of birth
order for older children. When looking at older children, even birth order one children are mis-
specified to be a smaller birth order than they actually are. The estimate for Postt being positive
and statistically significant at the 10 percent level implies children assigned birth order one in
my sample are 1.2 percentage points more likely to be a boy if they are born after abortion is
made legal. In a sample of older children, sex selection gets picked up at the first order as well,
which biases the estimate of the true effect for higher birth order children downward because the
counterfactual is also sex-selected. Additionally, since ratio of boys is just the percentage of boys
observed in the sample, it is impossible to distinguish between attrition in the sample (due to death
9 Repeating the analysis for children of age 10 or younger while investigating the effect of abortion legalization
on sex ratios for birth order 3 and higher and birth order 2 separately finds that the legalization of abortion led to
an increase in sex ratios by 0.024 for children born at birth orders 3 or higher. No statistically significant effects are
found for the first or the second birth order children. Lin et al. (2008) also finds sex ratios rise for birth orders 3 and
higher following the legalization of abortion, while no significant increases are observed for smaller birth orders.
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Table 2.2: Effect of abortion legalization on the ratio of boys
Dep var: Boy? [0,1] (1) (2)
Age Group 0-10 18-24
Order2plus× Post 0.0120** -0.0104
(0.0050) (0.0099)
Order2plus 0.0015 0.0003
(0.0032) (0.0061)
Post 0.0012 0.0124*
(0.0040) (0.0070)
Constant 0.519*** 0.504***
(0.0026) (0.0041)
Observations 183,652 47,549
Column 1 uses survey years 1978-2002,
Column 2 uses survey years 1996-2010.
Sample is children born between 1978 and
1996. Sample restricted to children with
birth years 1978 to 1992. Sample weights
used. Robust standard errors in paren-
theses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
or gaining independent status) and sex selection amongst older children. It must be emphasized
that not picking up an increase in sex selection for higher birth order children in the main sample
of college-aged children does not imply sex selection did not occur for them; when the same birth
year cohorts are observed at younger ages, the data are able to distinctively capture significant
increases in the proportion of boys for higher birth order children.
Nonetheless, I am unable to show that sex selection increased disproportionately more for
high birth order children born after the legalization of abortion in the main sample of college-aged
children. As a result, I cannot confidently rule out that a channel other than sex selection underlies
the effects reported in this analysis. It is, however, difficult to imagine a mechanism other than the
substitution hypothesis, that affects only the university enrollment of higher birth order girls and
not the university enrollment of first-born girls or higher birth order boys as well. Next, I describe
the main estimating equation to investigate the effect of abortion legalization on gender-specific
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university enrollment.
2.6 Estimating Equation
I estimate the effect of the legalization of abortion on university attendance separately for
boys and girls using a difference-in-differences (DD) specification described in Equation 2.2.
Universityity = β1(Ord2plusity × Postt) + β2Ord2plusity + γy + δt + ηiy + ΓXity + ity (2.2)
Equation 2.2 exploits the fact that sex selection increased most dramatically at higher birth orders.
Universityity is a dummy variable for whether child i, born in year t, has ever attended a university
by survey year y.10 Ord2plusity is a dummy variable for whether the child is of birth order 2
or higher and Postt is a dummy variable that equals one if the child is born in, or after, 1985
and is zero otherwise. In the equation are fixed effects for the survey year of observation, γy, and
fixed effects for the birth year of child, δt. Birth year fixed effects capture birth cohort effects, and
in combination with survey year fixed effects, control for the age of the child. Since birth year
fixed effects are perfectly collinear with the Postt variable, the main effect of Postt drops out of
the model when birth year fixed effects are added. Additional controls in Xity include per capita
household income and the age of the mother.
Taiwan initiated an education reform in 1996, which decentralized education in Taiwan and
also increased the number universities in Taiwan. Then it is important to control for changing
availability of education during the time period studied, and survey year fixed effects help control
for trends in education such as the number of universities in a particular year. Additionally, note
that my sample is college-aged (18-24 years old) children who are born between 1978 and 1992
and they are only observed in or after the 1996 surveys, following the Taiwanese education reform.
Given that the entirety of the sample is observed after the education reform and that the inclusion
of survey year fixed effects controls for education availability in a particular school year, it is unlikely
that the education reform explains the effects reported in this paper.
10 I exclude junior college from the definition of university.
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Additionally, declining fertility in Taiwan results in more one-child families. Children without
siblings may be more likely to attend college since household resources are not spread over siblings,
so I control for the number of children in the family. The full specification adds survey year-specific
number of children fixed effects, ηiy. I use survey year-specific number of children fixed effects
instead of just fixed effects for number of children because of declining fertility in Taiwan. It is
likely that a family with 3 children before the legalization of abortion in a time of higher fertility
is different from a family with 3 children after the legalization of abortion in a time of much lower
fertility. Including number of children fixed effects also controls for increased investments per child
caused by the reduced financial burden of unwanted children post-legalization.
In Equation 2.2, first-born children represent the counterfactual and β1 is the parameter of
interest. As shown in Equation 2.3, β1 is estimated by differencing out the mean effect of abortion
policy for first-born girls (boys) from the mean effect of abortion policy for girls (boys) at second or
higher birth orders. A positive value of βˆ1 indicates an increase in the rate of university attendance
for the second or higher birth order child beyond the improvement seen for the first birth order
child. Differencing out the effect of abortion legalization for the first birth order child from the effect
of abortion legalization for the higher birth order child removes any general trends in education
common between the first and higher birth order children. In a sample of college-aged children,
birth order one children are not a perfect counterfactual as some children assigned birth order one
are actually of a higher birth order and have also been sex selected. Since some of the birth order
one children also receive the “treatment,” the estimated effect will be biased downward due to this
mis-specification.
βˆ1 = (UnivOrd2plus,post − UnivOrd2plus,pre)− (UnivOrd1,post − UnivOrd1,pre) (2.3)
Causal interpretation of the effect relies on the assumption that without the legalization of
abortion, trends in education would have remained identical for the first and higher order births.
While it is not possible to test the equivalence of trends had the policy not been implemented, a
good indication that the trends would have remained the same is to show that trends across birth
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orders were similar prior to the reform. To show that pre-treatment trends are identical for boys
and girls of different birth orders prior to the reform, I estimate Equation 2.4 for the pre-legalization
period.
Univeristyit = β1(Ord2plusi ×BirthY eart) + β2BirthY eart + β3Ord2plusi + it (2.4)
The dependent variable is a dummy variable indicating whether child i, born in year t, has ever
attended a university. It is regressed on a dummy variable for birth order 2 or higher, a linear
birth year trend, and a linear birth year trend interacted with a dummy variable for birth order 2
or higher for a sample of college-aged children born prior to the legalization of abortion. Columns
1 and 2 of Table 2.3 limit the sample to only girls and boys respectively and present results from
estimating Equation 2.4. For the validity of gender-specific difference-in-differences models, it is
important that the coefficient on Order2plus × BirthY ear is indistinguishable from zero for a
sample of children born prior to legalization. I find this to be the case for both college-aged boys
and girls born prior to the legalization of abortion.
For additional evidence supporting parallel trends, Figure 2.2 shows university enrollment
trends by birth year, birth order, and gender. Solid lines represent trends for girls and the dashed
lines represent university attendance trends for boys. Verifying the results of Table 2.3, gender-
specific trends also appear to be parallel across birth orders in the figure. Figure 2.2 also shows a
closing birth order gap in university attendance for girls after the legalization of abortion in 1985,
but the gap does not narrow for boys. Given that the sample considers 18 to 24-year-old children
born between 1978 and 1992 and only surveys up to 2010 are available, later surveys mechanically
only include younger children. For example children born in 1992 are only included in the sample
at 18 years of age. I limit Figure 2.2 to years with identical age distribution of children, and as a
result 1986 is the last year in the graph.11 Younger children are less likely to have ever attended
a university since they have not been given the same amount of time to attend a university, and
11 Estimation of Equation 2.2 for the sample of children born between 1978 and 1986, as in Figure 2.2, finds a
statistically significant increase in the ratio of higher birth order girls attending a university by 3.5 percentage points,
and a negative and statistically significant effect of -4.4 percentage points is found for high birth order boys.
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Table 2.3: Pre-reform university attendance differentials by birth order and gender
Dep Var: Ever attend a University? [0,1] (1) (2) (3)
Girls Boys All
Order2plus×Birth Year×Girl – – -0.0028
– – (0.0059)
Birth Year×Girl – – 0.003
– – (0.004)
Order2plus×Girl – – 5.530
– – (11.63)
Girl – – -5.966
– – (7.822)
Order2plus×BirthYear -0.0025 0.0003 0.0003
(0.0042) (0.0041) (0.0041)
BirthYear 0.0507*** 0.0477*** 0.0477***
(0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0028
Order2plus 4.870 -0.660 -0.66
(8.329) (8.114) (8.114)
Constant -100.0*** -94.04*** -94.04***
(5.608) (5.452) (5.452)
Observations 14,450 14,801 29,251
All specifications use data from survey years 1996-2008. Sample restricted to
children of ages 18-24 born between 1978-1992. Sample weights used. Robust
standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
changing age distribution confounds the graph for later birth years. This is not an issue in the
regression analysis, because I include both birth year and survey year fixed effects, which essentially
help control for age.12
It is worth pointing out that girls, even prior to the legalization of abortion, generally have
12 In an effort to extend the timing of Figure 2.2, I graph residuals of Equation 2.2 by birth year in Figures A1 and
A2 of the Appendix. The residuals are estimated by running the model of Equation 2.2 with all of its fixed effects,
while excluding the main DD interaction term. Figure A1 shows that while the residuals for high birth order girls
born prior to the reform are generally below those for first-born girls, following abortion legalization the residuals
for high birth order girls generally lie above the residuals for first-born girls. Figure A2 shows that while there is
no apparent change in residuals for boys after abortion legalization, there seems to be a similar pattern for high
birth order boys starting in 1991. However, caution should be taken when interpreting the gap seen for boys in 1991
and 1992 because these birth years only contain about 4% of the sample, which results in very wide 95% confidence
intervals (shown in Figures A3 and A4) around these estimates. More importantly, the timing of the shift in residuals
for high birth order boys does not coincide with timing of abortion legalization. Column 1 of Table 6 shows that for
children born right around the law change (between 1982 and 1987), a statistically significant effect of 4.35 percentage
points for high birth order girls and a statistically insignificant and negative effect is observed for high birth order
boys.
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Figure 2.2: Birth order and gender-specific university enrollment trends. Figure uses data from
survey years 1996-2010.
higher university attendance rates than boys. Higher female college enrollment is observed in almost
all OECD economies and in most rich countries. Several reasons are cited for this including changes
in societal values, changes in future female employment, and behavioral differences between males
and females.13 Also, in most estimates, the returns to education is estimated to be larger for
females than for males (Goldin et al., 2006).
A fully interacted difference-in-difference-in-differences (DDD) model in which all of the terms
on the right hand side of Equation 2.2 are also included with their interactions with a fixed effect for
the child being a girl directly tests whether the effect of abortion legalization for girls is statistically
different from the effect for boys. A well-identified DDD model, in this case, requires that birth
order demeaned time trends in education for boys and girls are identical prior to the reform. That
is, we need the gap between low and high birth order girls to be moving at a similar rate as the
gap between low and high birth order boys. Although girls have a steeper trend in education
relative to boys starting in the early 1980s, this does not imply that the DDD assumption fails
because it is the gap between low and high birth orders that is of relevance for the DDD model.
13 See Goldin and Katz (2002), Card and Lemieux (2001), Charles and Luoh (2003), Cho (2007), Buchmann and
DiPrete (2006), and Jacob (2002).
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The assumption of parallel birth order demeaned trends for both genders is tested empirically by
estimating an equation similar to Equation 2.4 where all of the right hand side variables are also
included with their interactions with a dummy variable for a child being a girl. Column 3 of Table
2.3 presents the result from this estimation. For the validity of the DDD model, it is important
that the coefficient on Order2plus×BirthY ear×Girl is statistically indistinguishable from zero.
I find this to also be the case.
2.7 Empirical Results
Table 2.4 presents the results from estimating Equation 2.2. Identical specifications are
estimated for a sample of girls and boys in Panels A and B respectively, and Panel C presents the
fully interacted DDD estimated effect of abortion legalization for high birth order girls. Column 1 is
the basic difference-in-differences model and does not account for important time trends, birth year
effects, household income, or number of children effects. For Column 1, I also include the constant
term as it captures the mean university enrollment rates of first-borns prior to the legalization of
abortion. It can be seen that girls, even prior to the reform, were a little more likely to go to college
as the constant term for girls is larger, and it suggests that 46.7% of girls born prior to the reform
had attended a university as compare to 45.3% of the boys. Additionally, high birth order children
are less likely to have attended a university in comparison to first-born children. High birth order
girls born prior to the reform are about 6.8 percentage points less likely to attend a university
in comparison to first birth order girls born prior to the reform. Analogously, higher birth order
boys born prior to the reform are about 5.3 percentage points less likely to attend a university in
comparison to first birth order boys born prior to the reform. Results of Column 1 in Panel A imply
that the increase in university enrollment rate for second and higher birth order girls born after
the legalization of abortion is 4.86 percentage points greater than the increase in the university
enrollment rate for first birth order girls born after the legalization of abortion. This effect is
large and suggests that almost 70% of the educational gap that existed between high and low birth
order girls closes following the legalization of abortion. As shown in Column 2, the point estimate
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is robust to the inclusion of time trends and it moves down slightly due to a general increase in
university enrollment over time.14 Column 3 adds birth year fixed effects. The coefficient for
second or higher birth order girl born after the legalization of abortion is robust when accounting
for birth year fixed effects and remains at a 4.58 percentage points increase in university attendance
rate. Since richer families can afford tuition for college more readily and because families in the
more recent survey years are younger, Column 4 adds controls for income and mother’s age and
the effect does not change much. The number of children limits a family’s ability to afford tuition
for a particular child, and Column 5 adds survey year-specific number of children fixed effects. The
estimate for the effect of abortion legalization on university attendance rate of second or higher
order girls remains at a 4.29 percentage points increase for the preferred specification of Column 5.
Panel B repeats the identical analysis for boys. In all of the specifications, the coefficient on
birth order 2 and higher post-legalization is statistically indistinguishable from zero. Moreover, all
estimated effects for birth orders 2 and higher are smaller in magnitude for boys than their respective
estimates for girls. Panel C presents the DDD estimate of Order2plus×BirthY ear×Girl for each
specification. Indicative of having 2 valid DD models, the estimated effects using a DDD for higher
birth order girls are comparable to the simple DD estimates for high birth order girls of Panel A.
The statistical significance of the DDD estimates implies that the reported effects for boys and girls
are not the same.
14 Note that the estimate of Post is negative once survey year fixed effects are included in Column 2 of Table
2.4. With the inclusion of survey year fixed effects, the estimate of Post captures the difference in the likelihood of
university attendance for children born after the legalization of abortion within a particular school year. Simply put,
children born after the legalization of abortion in a specific survey year are systematically younger and the negative
estimate can be interpreted as an age effect.
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Table 2.4: The effect of abortion legalization on university attendance for girls and boys
Panel A: Girls (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep Var:
Ever attend a University? [0,1]
Order2plus×Post 0.0486*** 0.0423*** 0.0458*** 0.0487*** 0.0429***
(0.0135) (0.0131) (0.0130) (0.0131) (0.0136)
Order2plus -0.0678*** -0.0545*** -0.0516*** -0.0799*** -0.0927***
(0.00863) (0.00823) (0.00824) (0.00839) (0.00904)
Post 0.221*** -0.0737*** – – –
(0.00898) (0.0127)
Constant 0.464***
(0.00579)
Mean Dep Var 0.525 0.525 0.525 0.529 0.529
Observations 23,369 23,369 23,369 22,551 22,551
Panel B: Boys
Order2plus×Post 0.0089 -0.0058 0.0032 0.0015 -0.0076
(0.0135) (0.0131) (0.0132) (0.0132) (0.0139)
Order2plus -0.0532*** -0.0339*** -0.0325*** -0.0652*** -0.0840***
(0.0085) (0.0082) (0.0082) (0.0084) (0.0092)
Post 0.210*** -0.0533*** – – –
(0.0089) (0.0124)
Constant 0.453***
(0.0057)
Mean Dep Var 0.511 0.511 0.511 0.517 0.517
Observations 24,180 24,180 24,180 23,211 23,211
Panel C: Fully interacted DDD
Order2plus×Post×Girl 0.0397** 0.0480*** 0.0426** 0.0472** 0.0505***
(0.0191) (0.0186) (0.0185) (0.0186) (0.0194)
Observations 47,549 47,549 47,549 45,762 45,762
Survey Year FE no yes yes yes yes
Birth Year FE no no yes yes yes
No. of Children × survey yr FE no no no no yes
Additional Controls no no no yes yes
Table reports results from separate regressions for girls and boys in Panel A and Panel B respec-
tively. Panel C provides DDD estimates for girls from a fully interacted model. All specifications
use data from survey years 1996-2010. Sample restricted to children of ages 18-24 born between
1978-1992. Sample weights used. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05,
* p<0.1
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2.7.1 Heterogeneous Results
The reported increase in the rate of university enrollment for high birth order females fol-
lowing the legalization of abortion is heterogeneous across various socioeconomic classes. Table 2.5
presents the results by income, mother’s age at the time of birth, and whether the mother went to
college. It can be seen that the effect is largely driven by below the median income families, and
although high-income families exhibit a positive effect in magnitude, it is not statistically distin-
guishable from zero. Similarly, children born to mothers who never went to college help explain the
effect. Taken together, this is suggestive that families from relatively worse socioeconomic back-
grounds, or those that are likely more budget constrained, are driving the results. It is possible
that families from a better socioeconomic status already invest highly into their children and that
the legalization of abortion does not change their behavior of investing in the higher education of
their children.15
I also present the results by mother’s age at time of birth. In Table 2.5, mothers who are 26
years old or younger at the time of birth represent the young group, and mothers who are 27 years
old or older at the time of child’s birth are grouped in the old group.16 The results suggest that
high birth order girls born to both younger and older women after the legalization of abortion have
university enrollment rates that are about 5 percentage points greater than what they would have
been in absence of abortion legalization. However, for older mothers, it cannot be ruled out that
the high birth order boys also experience a similar effect, as the DDD estimate for higher birth
order girls is statistically insignificant.
15 For the low-income group, an average of 47% of the girls in the sample have attended a university, while the
analogous ratio for girls from the high income group is 60%. Similarly 51% of the daughters of mothers who have
never attended college have ever attended a university, and the analogous ratio for daughters of college-educated
mothers is 83%.
16 The split between “young” and “old” at 27 years of age is made at the median mother’s age.
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Table 2.5: Heterogeneous Effects
Income Mother’s Age Mother went to College
Low High Young Old No Yes
Panel A: Girls (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Dep Var:
Ever attend a Univ? [0,1]
Order2plus×Post 0.0542*** 0.0247 0.0551*** 0.0504** 0.0438*** -0.0299
(0.0185) (0.0201) (0.0198) (0.0209) (0.0142) (0.0437)
Mean Dep Var 0.471 0.597 0.472 0.603 0.509 0.828
Observations 12,193 10,358 12,806 9,745 21,224 1,327
Panel B: Boys
Order2plus×Post -0.00762 -0.00506 -0.0273 0.0302 -0.0133 0.0418
(0.0193) (0.0200) (0.0202) (0.0215) (0.0145) (0.0446)
Mean Dep Var 0.458 0.577 0.454 0.594 0.496 0.811
Observations 11,761 11,450 12,860 10,351 21,712 1,499
Panel C: DDD
Order2plus×Post×Girl 0.0618** 0.0297 0.0824*** 0.0203 0.0571*** -0.0717
(0.0267) (0.0284) (0.0283) (0.0300) (0.0203) (0.0624)
Observations 23,954 21,808 25,666 20,096 42,936 2,826
Table reports results from separate regressions for girls and boys in Panel A and Panel B
respectively. Panel C provides DDD estimates for girls from a fully interacted model. All
specifications include fixed effects for survey year, birth year, no. of children, and controls
for mother’s age and household income. All specifications use data from survey years 1996-
2010. Sample restricted to children of ages 18-24 born between 1978-1992. Sample weights
used. Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
2.8 Robustness Checks
Perhaps the most convincing way to determine that factors other than the legalization of
abortion are not underlying the effect is to look within a very small window around the legalization
of abortion and examine whether an effect still exists. When investigating the effect of abortion
legalization on 18 to 24-year-olds born between 1978 and 1992, there could be several unobservables
that change over time. In an attempt to minimize the number of varying unobservables, I estimate
Equation 2.2 for a sample of girls born within a smaller window of birth years near the legalization
of abortion. Column 1 in Table 2.6 presents the results from the most preferred specification, which
includes all of the fixed effects and controls of Table 2.4, for girls born in a 6-year window between
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1982 and 1987. The estimated effect of the legalization of abortion for higher birth order girls born
right around the policy change is an average of 4.35 percentage points increase in the university
enrollment rate. This is very close to the 4.29 percentage points effect estimated for the full sample.
Table 2.6: Robustness Checks: The effect of abortion legalization on university attendance for girls
and boys
Panel A: Girls (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Dep Var:
Ever attend a University? [0,1]
Order2plus×Post 0.0435** 0.0434*** 0.0516*** 0.0415*** -0.0047
(0.0195) (0.0133) (0.0175) (0.0142) (0.0169)
Mean Dep Var 0.601 0.529 0.618 0.529 0.434
Observations 10,288 22,551 13,541 22,551 13,988
Panel B: Boys
Order2plus×Post -0.0167 -0.00484 -0.0118 0.0081 0.0016
(0.0197) (0.0134) (0.0183) (0.0146) (0.0170)
Mean Dep Var 0.577 0.517 0.624 0.517 0.431
Observations 10,762 23,211 13,158 23,211 14,234
Panel C: Fully interacted DDD
Order2plus×Post×Girl 0.0602** 0.0482** 0.0634** 0.0335* -0.0063
(0.0278) (0.0189) (0.0253) (0.0204) (0.0240)
Observations 21,050 45,762 26,699 45,762 28,222
Survey Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
Birth Year FE yes yes yes yes yes
No. of Children× yr FE yes no yes yes yes
Comp. of Children × yr FE no yes no no no
Additional Controls yes yes yes yes yes
Age Group 18-24 18-24 20-24 18-24 18-24
Birth Years 1982-1987 1978-1992 1978-1992 1978-1992 1978-1984
Treatment Year 1985 1985 1985 1986 1981
Table reports results from separate regressions for girls and boys in Panel A and Panel
B respectively. Panel C provides DDD estimates for girls from a fully interacted model.
All specifications use data from survey years 1996-2010. Sample restricted to children
of ages 18-24 born between 1978-1992. Sample weights used. Robust standard errors
in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
One may also be concerned that it is not the number of children in a family that matters, but
the composition of children in a family. For example, a family with several college-aged children
may find it difficult to afford tuition for all of the children, while a family with young children
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and one college-aged child may find it easier to afford tuition for the one child who is of college-
age. Column 2 of Table 2.6 reports the estimates of Equation 2.2 with all of the fixed effects
and controls, but replaces survey year-specific number of children fixed effects with detailed survey
year-specific family composition fixed effects. For each survey year, the specification adds fixed
effects for number of daughters under the age of 18, number of sons under the age of 18, number of
college-aged daughters between the ages of 18 and 24, number of college-aged sons between the ages
of 18 and 24, number of daughters over 24, and number of sons over 24. The coefficient for girls at
the second or higher order remains around 4.34 percentage points and is statistically significant at
the 1 percent level.
Additionally, girls and boys may have differing opportunity costs of attending a university in
Taiwan and may enter a university at different ages. Limiting the sample to older children helps
account for the different opportunity costs associated with delayed university enrollment. Column
3 presents the results from limiting the sample to older girls who are between 20 and 24 years old.
Within the sample of older girls between the ages 20 and 24, higher birth order girls born after
the legalization of abortion are 5.16 percentage points more likely to attend a college. This effect
is statistically significant at the 1 percent level.
Because not all children born in 1985 could have been aborted, an argument can be made
for using either 1985 or 1986 as the post-legalization period. Column 4 presents the results from
redefining 1986 and after as the “post” period. Redefining the post-treatment period in such a way
does not yield a much different result for the sample of girls.
Limiting the sample to children born near the time of legalization does not rule out the
possibility that the increase in higher birth order female university attendance rate was caused by
an existing trend and not due to abortion legalization. One way to test whether a general trend of
improving educational levels for higher birth order girls existed in Taiwan is to investigate whether
an effect existed before the legalization of abortion. In column 5, I limit the sample to girls born
before the legalization of abortion in the years 1978-1984. I define 1981 as the year that the pseudo
61
treatment occurs. The reported magnitude of the effect of the pseudo treatment is -0.0047 for
higher birth order girls. It is not only statistically indistinguishable from zero, it is also negative
in magnitude.17 The lack of an effect for the placebo test provides additional evidence that the
preferred specification is not just capturing a general trend of a shrinking education gap between
high and low birth order girls.
Panel B presents results from limiting the sample to boys. In specifications 1 through 4 of
panel B, I do not find a statistically significant effect for higher birth order boys. Also consistent
with a lack of a general trend in improving educational outcomes for higher birth order boys, no
effect is found for the pseudo treatment defined in specification 5.18 To verify that the effects
reported are statistically different for boys and girls, I present the DDD estimates for high birth
order girls in Panel C. I am unable to reject that the effect for the pseudo treatment of specification
5 is statistically different for boys and girls as the DDD estimate is statistically insignificant. For
all other robustness checks, the reported effects for boys and girls are statistically different from
each other at the 10 or lower percent level.
2.9 Conclusion
I find evidence supporting the substitution hypothesis that prenatal gender discrimination
reduces postnatal discrimination for girls later in life. Once abortion is made legal, families with a
strong preference for a boy at a higher birth order (or strong distaste for a girl at a higher birth
order) choose to abort the higher order female fetus. Hence, girls born at higher birth orders
after the legalization of abortion are born into families with, on average, higher preferences for
girls. I find results consistent with this compositional change, with abortion legalization resulting
in an increase in the average rate of university attendance of higher birth order girls by about
4.5 percentage points. It is important to realize that these results do not imply that abortion
17 Investigating an effect for treatment years 1980 and 1982 for girls born before the legalization of abortion yields
an estimated effect of 0.00701 and -0.0132 respectively and both effects are statistically indistinguishable from zero.
18 Investigating an effect for treatment years 1980 and 1982 for boys born before the legalization of abortion yields
an estimated effect of 0.00791 and 0.00159 respectively and both effects are statistically indistinguishable from zero.
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legalization increased any one girl’s likelihood to attend a university, but rather increased the
average rate of attendance because girls that would have experienced less education, hence driving
the average rate of university attendance down, were never born. Consistent with no shift in
preferences for families who continue having boys, I find that the average rate of attending a
university does not change for boys born at the second or higher birth order after the legalization
of abortion. Moreover, I am able to reject the hypothesis that the two effects for boys and girls are
the same. Somewhat surprising, I show that gender discrimination exists in an arena (education)
for which girls are advantaged relative to boys to begin with. Results in the analysis are evidence
that there indeed has been discrimination against higher birth order girls in Taiwan, and suggest
that postnatal discrimination against their university enrollment is a substitute for prenatal sex
selection.
While these results are unable to speak to how sex-selective abortion compares to other
policies aimed to reduce gender discrimination, they shed light on the implications of the use of
sex-selective abortions to control a family’s gender composition. As families are shown to substitute
across prenatal and postnatal discrimination, placing bans against sex-selective abortions does not
provide the solution. As an alternative to placing bans on sex-selective abortions, Kalsi (2013),
for example, shows that an increase in female participation in local government roles is associated
with a decline sex selection in rural India. In hopes of eliminating both prenatal and postnatal
discrimination, policies targeted at reducing the underlying male preference should be implemented
instead.
Chapter 3
Sanitation and Health of Children in India
3.1 Introduction
It has been noted that nearly 5,000 children die everyday from dirty water and poor sanitation-
related diseases (The Economist, 2010). Open defecation increases the transmission of these dis-
eases since the practice often hinders the hygienic routine of washing hands with soap and water
(The Economist, 2010). Moreover the practice infects the water directly with bacteria if defecation
occurs near a water source. The need for better quality research on the role of sanitation on chil-
dren’s health has been recognized (Fewtrell et al., 2005). This research helps to fill the gap in the
existing literature and investigates the effect of reduced open defecation and increased sanitation
on reported diarrhea and other sanitation-related diseases amongst children in India, while paying
special attention to the state of Maharashtra.
The World Health Organization (WHO) cites diarrhea as one of the most common illnesses
acquired through water. Although the WHO lists diarrhea as a milder illness acquired through
water, malnutrition associated with the disease has some long term health consequences, which
in turn can retard economic growth. Research has even found that a large amount of stunting in
children of India can be explained by poor sanitation (Spears, 2013; Chambers and von Medeazza,
2013). My findings support the claims of Spears (2013) and Chambers and von Medeazza (2013)
and shows that improved sanitation is linked to a reduction diarrheal prevalence for children, and
suggests that reduced stunting in India’s children could be explained by the decline in sanitation-
relate diseases.
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To study the impact of sanitation on childhood health, I exploit a major reform in Indian
sanitation policy that was marked by the implementation of the Total Sanitation Campaign (TSC)
in April 1999 (Ganguly, 2008). TSC emphasized the role of the household, community, and educa-
tion in order to stimulate demand for sanitation to achieve its goals (Government of India, 2007).
Additionally, a community level incentive of a cash award, the Nirmal Gram Puraskar (NGP), was
announced in 1999. Village-level local bodies were rewarded if all households in their community
had access to sanitary toilets and the community was free of open defecation (Government of India,
2010). Although a nationwide program, TSC permitted states full control over implementation de-
cisions. As a result, a large amount of variation in implementation techniques, intensity, and success
was observed nationwide.
I argue that the state of Maharashtra experienced a large degree of sanitation success, as
suggested by the state earning the most number of NGP awards in the earliest stages of the
program. I study the impact of successful implementation of sanitation policies in the state of
Maharashtra on health outcomes of children. The empirical strategy I employ is a difference-in-
difference methodology, while using the state of Maharashtra as the treatment and the state of
Andhra Pradesh (a neighboring state with similar children’s health as Maharashtra prior to the
TSC) as the control. I find that improved sanitation resulted in a reduction of the occurrence of
diarrhea for children in Maharashtra. Additionally, I find that the prevalence of other sanitation-
related diseases also declined for children in Maharashtra. Using an alternative specification and
data source, I also study the impact of sanitation nationally rather than across just two states.
I investigate whether districts across India with more villages that have won the NGP award for
sanitation experience greater improvements in children’s health. I find evidence that districts with
more NGP awards experience an improvement in reported health of children. The remainder of
this paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the sanitation policy in more detail, Section
3 introduces that data, Section 4 presents the estimation strategies, Section 5 presents the results,
and Section 6 concludes.
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3.2 Sanitation Policy Initiatives
According to the Census of India over a fourth of India’s urban households lacked sanitation
facilities in 2001, and rural coverage was merely 21.9% (Ganguly, 2008).1 India has long recognized
the need for change, and nationwide policies date back to the 1980s. However, most efforts prior to
1999 have been labeled failures (Ganguly, 2008). While sanitation policy in India has historically
been supply-driven, recent attempts have shifted towards a more demand-driven approach. This
section provides a brief history of sanitation policy in India.
The Central Rural Sanitation Program (CRSP), launched in 1986, was India’s first nation-
wide sanitation program with the goal to eradicate open defecation. The program provided a large
subsidy of Rs 2,000 to households that were below the poverty line for the construction of sanitary
toilets (Ganguly, 2008). A review of the CRSP revealed that while several new toilets were con-
structed, they remained largely unused and the space was often used for storage purposes (Ganguly,
2008). Moreover, it was assumed that the subsidized toilets would drive demand for families that
could afford the technology, but this did not happen (Ganguly, 2008). The program led to a 1%
annual increase in rural sanitation coverage, but considering the investment of $370M, this increase
was negligible (Ganguly, 2008).
It became clear that education was necessary to stimulate demand, and as a result, strategies
shifted from subsidy to an effort to educate the population on areas of dignity and security for
women, health, and the affordability of adoption of sanitary technologies. A large reform was
implemented in 1999 and the CRSP was renamed the Total Sanitation Campaign (TSC). By 2008,
TSC was operating in 578 of the 610 Indian districts. The project outlay was $3.35B, of which $2.1B
was paid by the government, $43.7M was paid by the states and $500.7M was contributed by the
communities (Ganguly, 2008). The resources were made available to the local governments through
the state district water and sanitary committees. The funds were used to build household toilets,
school toilets, and also for construction of sanitary complexes for women which also included bathing
1 This section draws heavily from Ganguly (2008), a report on the success of the adoption of sanitation policies
in two Indian states of Maharashtra and West Bengal.
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facilities (Ganguly, 2008). Local governments also hired folk singers, painters and performing artists
to help motivate and educate the public on sanitary practices (Ganguly, 2008). Two states that
benefited the most from the program are - not surprisingly - those with well functioning delivery
systems of funds from the state to the local bodies (Ganguly, 2008). West Bengal and Maharashtra
both have strong local governments, and hence those were the states that reaped the largest benefits
from the TSC in its earliest years.
As already mentioned, the efforts in Maharashtra were unique and particularly successful. In-
stead of focusing on individual toilet construction, Maharashtra emphasized total coverage through
building sanitary complexes as well as individual household latrines (Ganguly, 2008). To encourage
community participation, several meetings were organized at the district, block, and the village
level (Devaki, 2001). Maharastran state government awarded cash to villages based on various
aspects including: drinking water on the basis of cleanliness, water waste disposal, performance
of sanitation committee, women’s participation, sanitation environment around houses, and chil-
dren’s hygiene habits (Devaki, 2001). Following this state effort, the government of India launched
a similar nationwide program called the Nirmal Gram Puraskar (NGP) in October 2003. NGP
awarded cash to village-level local bodies that achieved full sanitation, zero open defecation, and
adopted good hygiene behaviors. A more populated local body earned a larger award, for example
a village-level local body with population that is less than 1000 earned Rs. 100,000, while a village-
level local body with a population between 1000 to 1999 earned Rs 200,000 (Government of India,
2012). Additionally, the intent of the award money was to maintain sanitation in the villages, and
25% of the award money was released at the time of the announcement of the award, while 75%
of the award money was to be released after 2 years of its announcement (Government of India,
2012). The extent of early success in Maharashtra is captured by the number of NGP awards won
in Maharashtra by 2006: The state had won 394 NGP awards by 2006, while other states had won
an average of 20 NGP awards.
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3.3 Data
I use two different data sets in this analysis. The first data set is the Indian National Fertility
and Heath Survey (NFHS), which is publicly available from the Demographic and Health Survey’s
(DHS) website. I rely on child survey data which outline standard household characteristics as well
as health data for young children. I use the latest two phases of the Indian NFHS conducted in
1998-1999 (phase 2) and in 2005-2006 (phase 3). NFHS 2 includes health information for children
under 3 years of age, while NFHS 3 includes health information for children under 5 years of age.2
Because the state of Maharashtra was one of the only states that had achieved notable sanitation
by the time of the latest NFHS survey (2006), analysis using the NFHS focuses on the impact of
sanitation achieved in the state of Maharashtra.
I also make use of a different Indian representative health and fertility data set, the District
Level Household Survey (DLHS). These data can be purchased from the International Institute for
Population Sciences, Mumbai. I use phase 2 (1998/1999) and phase 3 (2007/2008) of the DLHS
survey. The benefit of introducing the DLHS data set is that the latest survey was conducted in
2007/2008, allowing analysis of sanitation policies adopted in more recent years. The data, however,
suffer from an alternative limitation. The phrasing of questions related to children’s health changed
from one survey year to another, complicating interpretation of the results. Nevertheless, the latest
survey of the DLHS was carried out two years after the latest survey of the Indian NFHS, which
allows analysis of sanitation policy implementation in more states.
3.4 Estimation Strategies
Since health tends to improve over time due to advancements in medicine and economic
growth, a simple regression that only compares health before and after Maharashtra experienced
an increase in the level of sanitation will prove to be a naive estimate of sanitation effects. Instead,
I attempt to single out the effect of TSC success in Maharashtra by employing a difference-in-
2 In my analysis, I limit the sample to children under 3 years of age to ensure that the age distribution does not
change across survey years.
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differences methodology, which removes time trends in health that are similar between the two
states of Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh. I argue that Andhra Pradesh is a good comparison
group for the DD design for several reasons. Andhra Pradesh is a neighbor of Maharastra, both
states have a shoreline and share a similar climate, and the two states are also similar in size and
population. Moreover, I also find that children’s health was similar in the two states prior to the
implementation of the TSC.
Equation 3.1 is a difference in differences (DD) model that compares health differences across
the states of Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh before and after many village-level local bodies in
Maharashtra achieved total sanitation.3 The sample in consideration is children under 3 years
of age. In the equation, Yistm is a health outcome of child i of state s, observed at a pre/post
sanitation period t, and in month m. I use rounds 2 and 3 of the NFHS surveys. Round 2 was
conducted in 1998-1999 and round 3 was conducted in 2005-2006. Since several Maharashtran
villages had earned a NGP award by 2006, observations that come from round 3 of the NFHS are
coded as the “Post” period. In Equation 3.1, the omitted group consists of children of Andhra
Pradesh observed in round 2 of the survey (pre-treatment). By 2006, the state of Andhra Pradesh
had only received 10 NGP awards, whereas the analogous number for Maharashtra was 394. The
model also includes a fixed effect for Maharashtra which equals 1 if the child is from Maharashtra
and a fixed effect for Post, which equals 1 if the child is observed in round 3 of the survey. The DD
term is the interaction of Maharashtra and Post and it is equal to 1 if the child is from Maharashtra
and is observed in round 3 of the survey, that is, after sanitation has occurred in Maharashtra.
Then, β1 is the parameter of interest, and it identifies the relative change in children’s health in
Maharashtra by 2006, relative to that of Andhra Pradesh. The equation also includes month fixed
effects, γm, as sanitation-related diseases could be impacted by seasonality. Also included in the
regression are age of child fixed effects, agei.
Yistm = β1Maharashtras × Postt + β2Postt + β3Maharashtras + agei + γm + istm (3.1)
3 While I argue the state of Andhra Pradesh is a good comparison state for the DD analysis, the results are
analogous if all Indian states are used as a comparison group and state fixed effects are introduced to the model.
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While validating that the state of Maharashtra experienced health benefits from the program
is important, TSC was a national program and the Maharashtran success could be explained by
various factors specific to the state. To study whether the effects are observed nationally, I make
use of a different dataset, the DLHS. I use phase 1 and phase 3 of the DLHS. These data include
child health information and also identify districts in India. The most recent DLHS was conducted
in 2007-2008, by which time many more states in India had village-level local bodies that had also
earned the NGP award.
While the obvious benefit of using the DLHS data is the inclusion of more Indian states,
the data suffer from a different limitation. The questions regarding children’s health are slightly
different across surveys, and thus magnitudes of the estimated effect are difficult to interpret.
During phase 1 of the survey, married women were asked to report whether thier last child under
the age of 5 had diarrhea within the last two months. Phase 3 of the survey asks married women
whether their last child under the age of 5 had suffered from diarrhea within the last two weeks.
While the different phrasing of the question makes it difficult to interpret the magnitude of the
estimates, the sign of the estimate remains informative. This is because a bias in the estimation of
the effect of post-sanitation is shared amongst districts with and without villages-level local bodies
that win a NGP award. Because a DD estimate compares relative changes across districts, a bias
that is similar across districts will be differenced out in the main effect as it compares the changes
in health in districts with more sanitation to changes in health in districts with less sanitation.
Equation 3.2 is a similar model to Equation 3.1, but exploits district-wise variation in the number
of villages that have been awarded the NGP by the 2007-2008 DLHS survey.
In Equation 3.2, Yidtm is a health outcome observed for child i, in district d, in a pre/post
sanitation period t, and in month m. Here, No. Awards indicates the number of village-level
local bodies within a district that have won a NGP award. Also included in the regression are
district fixed effects to difference out characteristics common to a district that may impact health
of young children. Additionally, I also include age of child fixed effects. Similar to Equation 3.1, I
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also include month fixed effects to difference out seasonality effects. Post is an indicator variable
that equals 1 if the observation is from phase 3 of the survey (2007/2008). The DD term is the
interaction of No. Awards and Post, and β1 is the parameter of interest and it estimates the change
in diarrheal prevalence across districts with different levels of sanitation success after sanitation was
achieved. Note that the main effect of No. Awards drops from the model when district fixed effects
are included.
Yidtm = β1No. Awardsd × Postt + β2Postt + agei + θd + γm + idtm (3.2)
3.5 Results
A key assumption in using a DD strategy of Equation 3.1 is that the effect of time is the same
in both the treatment and the control groups and affects the outcome of interest in an additive
manner. While I cannot test whether the two states have identical trends in health because I
only have two points in time (before and after sanitation achievement), I am unable to statistically
distinguish the difference between the two states’ pre-reform average health. To show this, I estimate
a simple OLS regression for the pre-reform period, where the dependent variable is a dummy for
whether a child had diarrhea within the last two weeks, and the independent variable of interest
is a dummy variable for the state of Maharashtra. The omitted category is Andhra Pradesh.
Since diarrheal prevalence may vary due to seasonality, I also include month fixed effects. Then
if the coefficient on Maharashtra is statistically insignificant, it is implied that, once seasonality is
controlled for, the prevalence of childhood diarrhea was similar in the states of Maharashtra and
Andhra Pradesh prior to TSC.
Table 3.1 shows differences in child diarrheal prevalence across Maharashtra and Andhra
Pradesh in the 1998-1999 period (prior to the implementation of sanitation in Maharashtra). I
present results by household’s standard of living to investigate if the benefits from sanitation policies
varied across higher and lower income families.4 Estimation results for all households are shown in
4 The survey ranks households standard of living based on facilities associated with the house and items that
belong to the household.
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Column 1, for those with a low standard of living in Column 2, for those with a medium standard of
living in Column 3, and finally for those with a high standard of living in Column 4. For the most
part, I find that it cannot be rejected that the prevalence of childhood diarrhea in Maharashtra
and Andhra Pradesh is the same pre-reform, and for most cases the coefficient on Maharashtra is
statistically indistinguishable from zero. However, for families that come from the highest standard
of living, I find that diarrheal prevalence was worse in Maharashtra in the pre-treatment period.
Table 3.1: Pretreatment differences between Maharashtra and Andhra Pradesh
All (1) Low (2) Med (3) High (4)
VARIABLES Diarrhea Diarrhea Diarrhea Diarrhea
Maharashtra 0.157 -0.001 0.032 0.277***
(0.120) (0.073) (0.209) (0.076)
Observations 2,746 800 1,353 504
Month and age of child fixed effects included in all specifications.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.2 reports the results from estimating the full DD model of Equation 3.1. As in Table
3.1, Columns 1, 2, 3, and 4 show results for the entire sample, low standard of living population,
medium standard of living population, and high standard of living population respectively. In
general, I find that diarrheal reports declined in Maharashtra relative to Andhra Pradesh by more
than 10 percentage points.5 The effects are greatest for individuals with a medium living standard
and statistically insignificant for those with the lowest standard of living.
5 According to the United Nations’ Millennium Project, improved sanitation reduces diarrhea morbidity by 37.7%,
and clean drinking water would reduce diarrhea episodes by 45% (Lenton et al., 2005).
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Table 3.2: Diarrhea: Maharashtra DD
All (1) Low (2) Med (3) High (4)
VARIABLES Diarrhea Diarrhea Diarrhea Diarrhea
Maharashtra×Post -0.117*** -0.058 -0.145*** -0.118**
(0.032) (0.085) (0.052) (0.060)
Maharashtra 0.148*** 0.093 0.188*** 0.136**
(0.029) (0.077) (0.045) (0.055)
Post -0.058*** -0.090*** -0.047** -0.030
(0.015) (0.034) (0.024) (0.031)
Observations 5,784 1,180 2,227 1,953
Omitted state is Andhra Pradesh.
Month and age of child fixed effects included in all specifications.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
To investigate other channels of improved health, I estimate Equation 3.1 for two different
dependent variables of interest. Tables 3.3 and 3.4 present the estimated effects of increased sani-
tation on children’s prevalence of cough and fever in the last two weeks. Fever and cough are often
a symptom of infectious diseases, which could be prevented with better sanitation and hand wash-
ing. I find that Maharashtrans of the lowest standard of living observe the highest improvement
for both cough and fever prevalence. While diarrheal prevalence remained unaffected for families
living in the lowest standard of living, rates of cough and fever declined the most for them. While
no improvement in diarrheal rates for the poorest families indicates that their access to sanitation
did not improve significantly by 2006, it is still possible that the children of these families expe-
rience improvements in health from a “spillover” of good health as cough and fever are known to
be infectious. It could be that improved health of children due to better sanitary practices such as
washing hands reduces the prevalence of cough and fever for a subset of a population, but because
these diseases are known to spread, even populations that do not experience improved sanitation
could benefit indirectly because fewer people are sick nearby. Then it is possible that the poorest
children still experience improvement in cough and fever, but not diarrhea, as these illnesses can
spread and the poor could have benefited from having healthier neighbors.
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Table 3.3: Cough: Maharashtra DD
All (1) Low (2) Med (3) High (4)
VARIABLES Cough Cough Cough Cough
Maharashtra×Post -0.156*** -0.270*** -0.161*** -0.068
(0.038) (0.102) (0.062) (0.071)
Maharashtra 0.201*** 0.277*** 0.173*** 0.157**
(0.033) (0.092) (0.053) (0.066)
Post -0.165*** -0.141*** -0.133*** -0.236***
(0.020) (0.044) (0.031) (0.042)
Observations 5,783 1,181 2,224 1,954
Omitted state is Andhra Pradesh.
Month and age of child fixed effects included in all specifications.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.4: Fever: Maharashtra DD
All (1) Low (2) Med (3) High (4)
VARIABLES Fever Fever Fever Fever
Maharashtra×Post -0.148*** -0.251*** -0.137** -0.052
(0.035) (0.090) (0.058) (0.070)
Maharashtra 0.201*** 0.268*** 0.191*** 0.127*
(0.031) (0.079) (0.049) (0.065)
Post -0.155*** -0.135*** -0.156*** -0.201***
(0.018) (0.037) (0.029) (0.041)
Observations 5,784 1,181 2,227 1,952
Omitted state is Andhra Pradesh.
Month and age of child fixed effects included in all specifications.
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Table 3.5 presents the results from estimating Equation 3.2. As mentioned earlier, the ques-
tions regarding children’s diarrheal prevalence are slightly different across the different survey years.
Because mothers are asked whether a child suffered from diarrhea within the last two months in
the “pre-treatment” survey year (DLHS phase 2) and whether a child suffered from diarrhea within
the last two weeks in the “post-treatment” survey year (DLHS phase 3), children observed in the
later years have diarrheal rates that are systematically lower than the children observed in phase
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2. This is simply because the question considers a smaller window of time in which a child could
have suffered form diarrhea. Then in estimation of Equation 3.2, the estimate on Post not only
captures over-time-improvements in health (hence a decline in diarrheal rates), but also captures
a mechanical drop in rates due to a smaller window of time in which diarrhea could be observed.
It is important to realize that although the effect on Post is convoluted, the sign of the effect on
No. Award×Post remains informative. This is because No. Award×Post captures the difference
between the change in diarrheal rates in districts with more village-level local bodies that have
successfully achieved sanitation to those with no village-level local bodies that have successfully
achieved sanitation.
Table 3.5: National Analysis: Number of Awards
(1)
VARIABLES Diarrhea
No. Award×Post -2.67e-04***
(7.08e-05)
Post -0.129***
(2.41e-03)
Observations 265,253
Month, age of child, and district
fixed effects included.
Robust standard errors in paren-
theses.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
By 2008, there were districts that had anywhere from 0 to 859 villages that had won the NGP
award for sanitation. Results in Table 3.5 indicate that a district with 859 village-level governments
that won the NGP experienced a decline in childhood diarrheal prevalence that is more than twice
(2.77 times) greater than districts with no village-level local bodies that won the NGP award. While
the results are unable to speak specifically to the rate of decline in diarrheal prevalence, a negative
and statistically significant coefficient estimate suggests that districts that were able to achieve
more sanitation had fewer children that suffered from diarrhea once sanitation was achieved.
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3.6 Conclusion
Diseases linked to poor sanitation, such as diarrhea, are amongst the most common illnesses
in many developing countries. In the most extreme cases, diarrhea can result in stunting of young
children, and can even result in death. India has long recognized the need to increase sanitation
and to eliminate open defecation. Exploiting a recent Indian campaign to increase sanitation, I find
evidence that increased sanitation reduced the prevalence of diarrhea and other sicknesses linked
to poor sanitation in the state of Maharashtra. I also find that these benefits are not specific to
the state of Maharashtra and that sanitation led to improvements in children’s health nationwide
in India.
This study is also an example of successful policy implementation. While historically Indian
policies on sanitation have been supply driven, the case of the TSC highlights the fact that educating
the public on the benefits and the implementation of sanitation can stir demand for sanitation and
in turn create successful adoption of sanitary policies. Overall, this study emphasizes the role of
good sanitation in significantly improving the health of Indian children.
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Appendix A
A.1 Attrition
This section studies attrition and birth order mis-specification in my sample by age and
gender. I perform a synthetic panel analysis to show that older children of the same birth year
cohort are more likely to be assigned a smaller birth order. Cohorts born in a specific year are
observed in different survey years at different ages, and within the sample, I observe a particular
birth year cohort as it gets older. While the main results rely on survey years 1996 to 2010, I
include older surveys from 1978 to 2010 for attrition analysis. This allows me to observe the cohort
of interest born in 1978 to 1996 from birth until the cohort becomes of college-age, and thus allows
me to study whether children are assigned a smaller birth order as they age within my sample.
Equation A.1 describes a Poisson regression that tests for mis-specification of birth order within a
birth year cohort as it gets older.
E(Birth Orderi) = exp(β0 +
24∑
j=1
βjAgej +
24∑
j=1
γj(Agej ×Girli) + γ0Girli) (A.1)
The dependent variable in Equation A.1 is the assigned birth order of child i, and it is regressed
on fixed effects for ages 1 to 24, with male children under the age of 1 as the omitted category.
Also included in the regression are age fixed effects interacted with a fixed effect for being a girl.
Equation A.1 is estimated separately for each birth year. Table A1 presents the results from
estimating Equation A.1 for birth year cohorts 1981 to 1988.1 Column 1, for example, includes a
1 Results from earlier years 1978-1980 and later years from 1989-1992 are similar.
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sample of children born in 1981 observed at different ages in different survey years.
The estimate of exp(β1), for example, gives the ratio of average birth order assigned to
children born in 1981 when observed at age 1 divided by birth order assigned when the cohort
was under the age of 1. This ratio for the 1981 cohort suggests that birth order assigned to a
cohort decreases by 2% after the child turns one, but this decline is not statistically significant.
The analogous ratio for the 1981 cohort at age 24 suggests that the average assigned birth order is
36% smaller than what it was when the cohort was observed in infancy. If there was no attrition of
children (caused by death or adult children gaining independence), the cohort’s birth order should
not change as the cohort ages. The large negative point estimates are indication that in the sample
there is under-assignment of birth order for older children.
Additionally, if female attrition rates are no different than male attrition rates, then the
estimate of each γj should also equal zero for all ages. Only 12 out of 53 of the college-aged girl-
specific age effects are statistically distinguishable from zero, but the signs on significant estimates
are sometimes positive and other times negative. Also, the magnitude of these effects is relatively
small. These findings combined suggest that attrition, or birth order under assignment, amongst
18 to 24 year olds in my sample is not different across boys and girls.
In an effort to report a smaller table, the coefficient for younger ages’ fixed effects are not
reported, but in general when the birth year cohort is observed at much younger ages, the birth
order mis-specification is much smaller and often indistinguishable from zero. For example, the
estimated coefficient for age 1 is mostly zero, implying that children of the same birth year cohort
observed at an age under 1 are no more or less likely to be assigned birth order 3 or greater than
when the same birth year cohort is observed at age 1. Overall, my findings suggest the birth order
mis-specification in the sample is substantial within the group of 18 to 24-year-old children.
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Table A1: Poisson Estimates- Gender-specific birth order mis-specification for older children
Dep Var: Birth Order (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Birth Year 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988
Age 1 -0.02 -0.01 0.02 0.01 0.00 -0.04 -0.06* -0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
Age 18 -0.33*** -0.31*** -0.28*** -0.25*** -0.24*** -0.24*** -0.25*** -0.21***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Age 19 -0.35*** -0.32*** -0.31*** -0.24*** -0.28*** -0.31*** -0.31*** -0.23***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Age 20 -0.38*** -0.33*** -0.35*** -0.28*** -0.26*** -0.28*** -0.31*** -0.29***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Age 21 -0.43*** -0.26*** -0.37*** -0.36*** -0.35*** -0.29*** -0.30*** -0.34***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Age 22 -0.38*** -0.36*** -0.36*** -0.38*** -0.38*** -0.36*** -0.35*** -0.36***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Age 23 -0.44*** -0.37*** -0.34*** -0.36*** -0.37*** -0.41*** -0.39***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Age 24 -0.45*** -0.42*** -0.39*** -0.38*** -0.31*** -0.39***
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Girl -0.02 -0.03 -0.02 0.05* -0.00 0.02 -0.03 -0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03)
Age× Girl 1 -0.07** 0.03 -0.06** -0.02 -0.03 0.00 -0.03 -0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
. . . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . . .
Age 18× Girl 0.00 0.04 0.06 0.01 -0.02 0.02 0.04 -0.06*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Age 19× Girl 0.07** -0.02 -0.00 -0.04 0.01 0.07 0.02 -0.07*
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Age 20× Girl 0.04 -0.00 0.02 0.00 0.02 -0.01 0.10** 0.06
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Age 21× Girl 0.10** -0.08* 0.08* 0.07* 0.01 -0.04 -0.01 0.08*
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Age 22× Girl -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 0.04 0.03 0.04 -0.04 -0.00
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Age 23× Girl 0.01 -0.03 -0.10** 0.07 0.10** 0.05 0.05
(0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Age 24× Girl 0.07 -0.02 -0.04 0.09** -0.03 0.08
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05)
Constant 0.82*** 0.79*** 0.78*** 0.74*** 0.75*** 0.72*** 0.72*** 0.73***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Observations 28,474 26,805 24,468 22,980 20,829 17,666 17,401 18,479
A Poisson regression is estimated for a specific birth year cohort and includes age fixed effects for
ages 0-24 and age interacted with girl fixed effects. Omitted category is age 0 boy. Sample in
Table uses data from survey years 1981 to 2010. Sample weights used. Robust standard errors in
parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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A.2 Birth Order Analysis
Figure A1: Girls: Mean residuals of college attendance rates by birth year.
Figure A2: Boys: Mean residuals of college attendance rates by birth year.
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Figure A3: Girls: Mean residuals of college attendance rates and 95% confidence intervals.
Figure A4: Boys: Mean residuals of college attendance rates and 95% confidence intervals.
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Table A2: Birth Order-Specific Effects
VARIABLES Girls Boys
Order=2×Post 0.0545*** 0.00990
(0.0145) (0.0146)
Order=3×Post 0.00348 -0.00382
(0.0249) (0.0244)
Order≥4plus×Post 0.0445 -0.00596
(0.0649) (0.0625)
Post 0.221*** 0.210***
(0.00898) (0.00885)
Order=2 -0.0519*** -0.0407***
(0.00949) (0.00933)
Order=3 -0.104*** -0.0825***
(0.0143) (0.0146)
Order≥4 -0.161*** -0.129***
(0.0321) (0.0316)
Constant 0.464*** 0.453***
(0.00579) (0.00570)
Observations 23,369 24,180
Sample uses data from survey years 1996 to 2010. Sample restricted to
children of ages 18-24 born between 1978-1992. Sample weights used.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table A3: Birth Order-Tabulations in Sample
Girls Boys
Birth Order Pre Post Pre Post
1 8,103 4,978 8,289 5,324
2 4,658 3,146 4,835 3,164
3 1,458 710 1,425 798
4 210 77 229 88
5 21 8 21 5
6 - - 2 -
Table reports tabulations of birth
order, gender and pre and post
abortion legalization specific obser-
vations in the main sample. Sample
uses data from survey years 1996 to
2010. Sample restricted to children
of ages 18-24 born between 1978-
1992.
